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An Introduction in Narrative: 
The topic of women of color nurturing in the service of White1 culture 
is important to the ways we understand mothering, the cultural burdens 
placed on women of color who mother White children, and the reciprocal 
relationships of nurture between White children and their mothers of color 
that deserve some respect in the law.2 To help the reader better understand 
my thesis and appreciate why this topic is important to me personally, I 
begin this paper with a narrative. So, with you, dear reader, I share a bit of 
my family history. 
It might help to know that I am African-American.3 As with many 
African-Americans, I come from a close, extended family of people related 
by blood and marriage as well as affection and struggle. As a young adult, 
I overheard one of my "great-aunts,"4 who is also African-American, talk-
ing with pride about the successes of "her boys." This conversation struck 
me as odd. I had known this woman all of my life, and there was one thing 
I was sure about: she did not have any children. If she had had children, I 
1. I have chosen to capitalize the words "White" and "Black" when they refer to a 
person's race in order to reflect the political and social significance of race in this country. 
Cf. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1331-32 n.2 (1988) 
(stating that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other "minorities," constitute a specific cul-
tural group and thus require denotation as a proper noun); Victor F. Caldwell, Book Re-
view, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1369-70 (1996) (reviewing the critical race theory: the key 
writings that formed the view on race acknowledge past and continuing racial subordination 
and oppression and do not treat race as merely reflecting skin color or ancestral origins). I 
have also chosen to use the terms "Black" and "African-American" interchangeably. 
2. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
tim's Story, 87 M1CH. L. REv. 2320, 2322-24 (1989) (regarding the importance of narratives 
in transforming law); Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of 
Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1029-30 (1992) (same). 
3. Given the rate of miscegenation in the American South, being African-American in 
this culture means almost definitionally that one is multi-racial. Nevertheless, I primarily 
claim those African roots. 
4. In fact, blood or marriage did not relate this woman to me. Rather she was my 
grandmother's life-long best friend and the informally adopted daughter of my great-
grandmother. 
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would have known them. They would be part of my extended family. De-
spite this glaring contradiction, my great-aunt continued to talk not only 
about the success of her boys but also about the pride she had that they 
took care of her in her old age. They made sure that all of her needs were 
met during her years of retirement. My interest was piqued, so I continued 
to listen. "Her boys" were White men she had cared for as children while 
she served as a domestic worker for a White family. I was not surprised to 
discover that she had been a domestic servant in her younger days.5 Nor 
was I really surprised that she held some degree of affection for these chil-
dren she had raised. The depth of her affection for "her boys" and the 
apparent reciprocity of those feelings did surprise me. But what surprised 
me the most was that she understood her experience with these children as 
one of mothering and that the children, at least as adults, seemed to under-
stand this as well. 
I had long known that women formally and informally mothered chil-
dren whom they had not borne and with whom they shared no traditional 
family relationship. African-American women, like other women in the 
African Diaspora, have always participated in these types of mothering pat-
terns-patterns that are outside of and unacknowledged by White, Ameri-
can, and Western norms. 6 I had also known for a very long time that 
Black women mothered White children and that their contributions to these 
children are unacknowledged by our culture7 and by the children them-
selves as a result of racism. But my aunt and these boys of hers made me 
believe that a paradigm shift might be possible. 
An Introduction in Law: 
During my first year of teaching a course in reproductive technologies 
and rights, I came across a case that seemed to go beyond the "traditional" 
mothering experience of my great-aunt and the experiences of other wo-
5. Historically, poor women of color have been over-represented in domestic service. 
See TERESA L. AMorr & JULIE A. MATTHAE1, RAcE, GENDER & WoRK: A MULTICULTURAL 
EcoNOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 160 (1991). 
6. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990); CAROL 
B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN (1974). 
7. During my college years, one very stark example of this lack of acknowledgement 
was made clear to me while going to playgrounds and parks on the Upper East Side of New 
York City with White friends. The parks were always filled with White children and wo-
men of color, who were charged with the children's care. I rarely saw a White woman with 
White children in those parks, and, indeed, I was often the only woman of color in the parks 
not caring for a White child. 
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men of color as domestic servants raising White children. It was the case 
of Anna Johnson and Mark and Crispina Calvert. 8 
On January 15, 1990, Mark and Crispina Calvert, identified by the 
press as a White married couple,9 entered into a contract with Anna John-
son, an African-American single mother. Ms. Johnson promised to gestate 
an embryo that had been created with Mark Calvert's sperm and Crispina 
Calvert's ovum. Ms. Johnson promised to nurture the fetus through preg-
nancy and deliver a healthy baby to the Calverts. In this contract for gesta-
tional surrogacy, Ms. Johnson further promised to relinquish "all parental 
rights" to the resulting child to Mark and Crispina Calvert. 10 For these 
services, the Calverts promised to pay Ms. Johnson a sum of ten thousand 
dollars. II 
Towards the end of the pregnancy, Ms. Johnson indicated that she 
might refuse to give up the child. The Calverts responded by seeking a 
declaratory judgment that they were the legal, and hence only, parents of 
any child resulting from the contract. Ms. Johnson in turn sought a declar-
atory judgment that she was the legal mother of the child to whom she was 
about to give birth. I2 The trial court found, and the California Court of 
Appeals affirmed, that because Mark and Crispina Calvert were the genetic 
parents of the resulting child, they were the "natural" and legal parents. 
The court held that Ms. Johnson, the birth mother, was a stranger to the 
child and, as a result, not entitled to any legal relationship with the result-
ing child. 13 By concentrating their analysis on the genetics or "blood"14 of 
8. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-63-31-90, slip op. at 2 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. filed 
Nov. 21, 1990), ajf'd sub nom. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991), 
ajf'd sub nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Baby 
Boy J. v. Johnson, 510 U.S. 938 (1993); see also Calif. Judge Speaks on Issue of Surrogacy, 
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 36. 
9. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1007, 1024 (1996). 
10. Anne Reichmann Schiff offers a good working definition of gestational surrogacy: 
[A]n egg is extracted from the man's wife or partner, or possibly from an egg 
donor, and fertilized with the man's sperm [or donor sperm] in vitro. The result-
ing embryo is transferred and implanted into the uterus of the birth mother who, 
after carrying the fetus and giving birth, transfers the child to the man and his wife 
or partner, relinquishing her parental rights. 
Anne Reichmann Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Comm-
drum of Legal Maternity, 80 lowA L. REv. 265, 272 n.36 (1995). 
11. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778; Sherrie Lynne Russell-Brown, Parental Rights and Ges-
tational Surrogacy: An Argument Against the Genetic Standard, 23 CoLUM. HuM. RTs. L. 
REv. 525, 541 n.62 (1992) (discussing the fact that a ten thousand-dollar salary for a nine-
month pregnancy is equivalent to compensation of $1.54 per hour given that pregnancy is a 
twenty-four hour per day ·~ob"). 
12. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
13. See id. 
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the parties and of the child, the court found it inconceivable for a woman 
who is genetically unrelated to a child to have parental rights to that child. 
Using genetics as the focus of its analysis, the court found it impossible to 
acknowledge or to even consider that a Black woman could legally mother 
a White child. 15 Consequently, Johnson v. Calvert16 demonstrates that, by 
and large, Black women who participate in surrogate parenting arrange-
ments will not be recognized as having any relationship to the children they 
bear. Thus, their experiences will differ sharply from the experience of 
White surrogates. 
Since the initiation of this technology, feminist activists and scholars 
have expressed concern and criticism regarding these contracts because of 
the social, political, and economic inequalities that these contracts evi-
dence.17 For example, these contracts most often involve working-class 
women who agree to act as surrogates because of their limited economic 
means18 and intended parents with large amounts of disposable income.19 
In fact, striking similarities exist between surrogacy contracts and contracts 
14. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1709, 1737-
40 (1993). 
15. I focus my analysis on the institution of motherhood as it relates only to Black and 
White women. I do this not to make invisible the impact of the institution on other women 
of color, but rather I focus here on Black and White women because in our culture, due in 
part to the institution of slavery, Black people are viewed as being in direct opposition to 
White people. I also focus my analysis on Black women because in U.S. culture, race 
(meaning non-White) is pejorative and firmly associated with Blackness. This phenome-
non, I believe, is also a result of the "peculiar" institution of slavery in the United States. 
See, e.g., id. at 1737-40. 
16. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
17. E.g., GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 228-29 (1985); see also PHYLLIS 
CHESLER, SACRED BoND 113 (1988) (comparing surrogacy to slavery); Nancy Ehrenreich, 
Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the Surrogacy and Abortion 
Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1369, 1379-80 (1992) (book review) (criticizing 
defenders of surrogacy for ignoring the issue of economic exploitation). But see, e.g., Loru 
B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTIIERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS, & 
BRA vE NEw BABIES ( 1989) (including accounts of women using surrogacy as a way to help 
other women). 
18. Women who act as surrogates often give other, often altruistic, reasons for their 
decision. But because surrogate brokers report that they refuse to hire women for whom the 
money is important, I remain suspicious of the altruistic motives usually articulated, as they 
may be connected with both the need for the money and the brokers' expectations. See 
Russell-Brown, supra note 11, at 543 n.69 (citing Philip Parker, Motivation of Surrogate 
Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 117, 117-18 (1983) (noting that 89% of 
those studied indicated that a fee was necessary in order to consider acting as a surrogate)). 
19. The fees paid by the contracting couple for surrogacy routinely range between fifty 
and sixty thousand dollars. For example, one surrogate broker reportedly pays the surro-
gates she hires between fifteen and twenty thousand dollars. The remainder of the fee 
includes the cost of medical expenses, health insurance, attorney's fees, and the agent's fee. 
Elinor Burkett, Meet the Baby Broker, GLAMOUR, Jan. 1999, at 156, 158. 
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for sexual prostitution.20 In both instances, poor women sell what is usu-
ally defined as a necessity for one's self-ownership. Professor Carole 
Pateman has argued: 
In the controversy over "surrogate" motherhood, the comparison 
with prostitution is often made .... Most of the arguments used 
to defend or condemn prostitution have reappeared in the contro-
versy over "surrogate" motherhood. Obviously, surrogacy con-
tracts raise questions about the conditions of entry into the 
contract and economic coercion. The sexual division of labour in 
patriarchal capitalism and the "feminization of poverty" ensure 
that a surrogacy contract will appear financially attractive to 
working-class women, although the payment is very meagre for 
the time involved and the nature of the service. Class questions 
are also clearly raised .... However, emphasis on class inequality 
and economic coercion to enter the contract, draws attention 
away from the question of what exactly is being contracted for 
and how the surrogacy contract resembles or differs from other 
contracts about property in the person.21 
In the case of sexual prostitution as well as surrogate motherhood, one of 
the primary issues is whether the "work" involved in these contracts shares 
much in common with the work involved in other types of paid labor. 
Many feminist scholars argue that it does not. Unlike other forms of paid 
labor, the work of prostitution and gestation "entails a very high degree of 
self-alienation" because it requires women to invest their "emotional, phys-
ical, and sexual experiences and understandings of themselves as wo-
men."22 Author Gena Corea has also noted the potential for the operation 
of racism in creating a breed of women of color prostituted in surrogacy.23 
In addition, other scholars and commentators have noted that Black women 
are ripe for exploitation where gestational surrogacy is possible because 
20. CoREA, supra note 17, at 275-76 (asserting that sexual prostitutes sell vagina, rec-
tum, and mouth, while reproductive prostitutes sell other body parts: womb, ovaries, eggs); 
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 211-12 (1988). 
21. PATEMAN, supra note 20, at 211-12 (citations omitted). 
22. Mary Lyndon Shanley, "Surrogate Mothering" and Women's Freedom: A Critique 
of Contracts for Human Reproduction, 18 SIGNS 618, 627 (1993) (citing Carole Pateman's 
critique of contract pregnancy that the alienation involved in selling gestational services is 
"so extreme as to make it illegitimate"); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 
U. Cm. L. REv. 209, 249 (1995) ("Unlike most paid laborers, the surrogate mother cannot 
separate herself from the service she performs."). 
23. CoREA, supra note 17, at 276 ("Certainly women of color would be labeled 
'nonvalued' and used as breeders for the embryos of 'valuable' women."). 
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they are poor and because their claims to the White children they gestate 
will be seen by courts as less valid. 24 
Indeed, this fear may be justified. In cases involving traditional surro-
gacy, the surrogates as well as the contracting fathers tend to be White.25 
In these cases, when there is a dispute regarding legal parentage, courts 
have recognized the surrogate as the child's legal mother.26 For example, 
in In re Baby M,21 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that surrogate 
24. Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding Against the Oppres-
sion of Su"ogacy, 8 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 29, 48 (1993); Anita L. Allen, The Black 
Surrogate Mother, 8 HARv. BLACKLEITER J. 17, 30-31 (1991); Katha Pollit, When is a 
Mother Not a Mother?, THE NATION, Dec. 31, 1990, at 825, 842. 
25. Itabari Njeri, The Pain of Infertility, One Couple's Choice, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
1987, § 6, at 12 (stating that the average surrogate mother is White, has attended two years 
of college, and is married). White women as surrogates are essential in traditional surro-
gacy, because in traditional surrogacy the surrogate is inseminated with the sperm of the 
contracting man. The surrogate provides both her body for gestation and her ova for the 
other half of the needed genetic material. She is both the birth mother and the genetic 
mother of the child. Hence, if the contracting couples, whom are most often White, want 
White children, they must use White women as surrogates. The race of the surrogate is less 
important in gestational surrogacy, because in gestational surrogacy the surrogate provides 
only her body for gestation. The surrogate provides no genetic material to the resulting 
child. 
26. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (involving a White surrogate who 
was the child's genetic and birth mother and holding that surrogate contract unenforceable). 
Notably, in Baby M, the wife of the contracting man was not part of the contract because of 
her fear that the transaction would be viewed as baby-selling. Even in states that enforce 
surrogacy contracts, birth mothers generally are required to relinquish their parental rights 
in favor of the intending couple. This process generally supports the analysis that even in 
these jurisdictions the birth mother is the original, legal mother. 
Statutes in Arizona, the District of Columbia, Indiana, New York, North Dakota, and 
Utah deny enforcement of all surrogacy contracts. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §25-218 (West 
2000); D.C. CoDE ANN. §16-402 (1997); IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-20-1-1 (West 1999); N.Y. 
DoM. REL. §122 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 14-18-05 (1997); UTAH CoDE 
ANN. § 76-7-204 (1999). 
Nevertheless, states are increasingly enforcing surrogacy contracts. For example, stat-
utes in Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington deny enforcement of surrogacy 
contracts only if the surrogate is compensated. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 
1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995); 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 26.26.2300 (West 1997). 
In Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia, statutes provide that some uncom-
pensated surrogacy contracts are enforceable. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West 1997 & 
Supp. 2001); NEv. REv. STAT. § 126.045 (2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 
(1994); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 20.159 (Michie 2000). Furthermore, New Hampshire and Vir-
ginia also require judicial approval of the surrogacy agreement prior to insemination. N.H. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.159 (Michie 2000). And in 
Florida and Arkansas, statutes provide that the intended mother is the legal mother of the 
child born as a result of surrogacy. FLA. STAT.§ 742.11 (West 2001) (excepting gestational 
surrogacy); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998). 
27. 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988). 
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mothering contracts were invalid and against public policy and that the 
birth mother of a child was its natural and legal mother.28 In contrast, 
where Black women serve as surrogates in gestational surrogacy, Johnson 
v. Calvert instructs us that courts are unwilling to recognize African-Amer-
ican women as legal mothers, because these surrogates lack a genetic tie to 
the children. Thus, Johnson v. Calvert offers a window into the future and 
forces us to ask why the claims of Black women to the White children they 
mother have never been, and probably never will be, recognized. 
I approach this last question, involving race, motherhood, and gesta-
tional surrogacy, by looking at courts' opinions in the case of Johnson v. 
Calvert and the racialized institution of motherhood. In the next section, I 
discuss motherhood as a social institution. I contrast some of the radical 
feminist critiques of motherhood, which recognize motherhood as institu-
tionalized and compulsory, with Black feminist criticism, which under-
stands motherhood as a site of power for African-American women. In 
Section ill, I discuss the current popular understanding of the cultural and 
legal dictates of institutionalized motherhood from a historical perspective, 
focusing on the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries' cult of do-
mesticity as a way of understanding the present social requirements of 
motherhood. In addition, I discuss the ways in which the ideology of ra-
cism alters the standards for judging Black women as mothers. In Section 
IV, I tackle the case of Johnson v. Calvert in greater detail and address the 
lack of recognition, by the dominant culture, of African-American wo-
men's ties to White children. Finally, in Section V, I conclude that the 
oppressive use of White power provides the answer to whether law can and 
will give legal recognition to the mothering relationships between Black 
women and the White children they mother. 
II. Motherhood as an Institution 
It was as Mother that woman was fearsome; 
it is in maternity that she must be transfigured and enslaved. 29 
A. Radical Feminist Critiques 
The institution of motherhood has played and continues to play a vital 
role in the construction of gender and, as a result, in the maintenance of 
28. Id. at 1246-50. Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's order awarding custody to the child's biological father, on the grounds that the 
father's custody was in the child's best interest. Id. at 1258. 
29. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 193 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage 
Books 1974) (1949). 
2001] Nurturing in the Service of White Culture 91 
social, economic, and political power in the hands of White men. 30 Be-
cause motherhood has been shaped and commodified by the prevailing pa-
triarchal norms, women do not own motherhood. The meaning of 
motherhood for women has been created largely in response to having the 
institution forced upon them. As a result, motherhood as an institution 
includes more than biological motherhood. It has political and social 
dimensions as well. 31 
Biological motherhood consists of all activities necessary to bring life 
to a fetus and physically sustain a newborn infant. Hence, biological moth-
erhood traditionally has included pregnancy, childbirth, and suckling.32 It 
is the actual or presumed ability to become pregnant and gestate a fetus 
that has been used in the law to heavily restrict women's economic activ-
ity. 33 In the political arena, women are controlled as mothers by the state 
or by other male-controlled institutions, such as medicine and law.34 It has 
been noted that the political institution of motherhood "is visible in the 
male dispensation of birth control and abortion; the guardianship of men 
30. NANCY J. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTI-IERING 9 (1978); ADRIENNE 
R.lcH, OF WOMAN BoRN: MOTI-IERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND lNsTITUTION 64 (1976); Iris 
Marian Young, Is Male Gender Identity the Cause of Male Domination?, in MornERING: 
EssAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 129, 134 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); see also Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 
I, 3 ( 1993) (arguing that racism and patriarchy are interrelated in the social construction of 
motherhood). 
31. LINDA GORDON, WoMAN's BoDY, WoMAN's RIGHT 10-11 (1976) (identifying the 
components of motherhood as biological, social, and ideological). I believe that the ideo-
logical component Gordon describes is a fundamental part of the social and political institu-
tions of motherhood. See RICH, supra note 30, at 13 (proposing that motherhood has two 
components: biological and social). 
32. GoRDON, supra note 31, at 10; RICH, supra note 30, at 12-13. Perhaps suckling is 
no longer a necessary biological activity, given the widespread availability of commercial 
infant formula, notwithstanding the documented health benefits of breastfeeding to infants. 
33. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) Gustifying the 
refusal of a woman's right to practice law because the "harmony ... of interests and views 
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a wo-
man adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband"); Muller v. Ore-
gon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (holding that statutory limitations placed on a woman are 
for the benefit of all because "the physical well-being of woman [is] an object of public 
interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race"). 
Shularnith Firestone argues that gender inequality is the first class antagonism and that 
it arises from the biological fact of women's capacity to reproduce. Taking a biological 
deterministic view, she argues that women's reproductive capabilities "led directly to the 
first division of labor based on sex." SHULAMITI-I FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEx 9 
(1970). 
34. See CATI-IARINE A. MACKINNON, Tow ARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF TI-IE STATE 162 
(1989) ("The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the 
interest of men as a gender-through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and 
substantive policies."). 
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over children in the courts and the educational systems . . . the economic 
dominance of the father over the family; [and] the usurpation of the birth 
process by the male medical establishment."35 
The social institution of motherhood is significant in understanding 
how women are disempowered and confined in their role as mothers. So-
cial motherhood is usually understood as the work that women are cultur-
ally required to perform as childrearers.36 For example, in both Black and 
White communities, the "socialization of children and the cleaning, cook-
ing and nurturing functions" are all work that disproportionately falls on 
women under the rubric of social motherhood. 37 But, in fact, social moth-
erhood is a multifaceted patchwork of ideology and symbolism. 
In her critical work on the social institution of motherhood, Adrienne 
Rich expands the definition of social motherhood. She describes it as an 
institution that includes the ideology that the separation of childbirth and 
childrearing is immoral; the symbolism of lactation, which views women 
as the natural nurturers and nourishers of all children and men;38 and the 
ideology of femininity, which requires suppression of women's sexuality .39 
Hence, the social institution of motherhood objectifies women as mothers. 
Philosopher Jeffner Allen suggests that this objectification of women in 
motherhood is dangerous, because it reduces women to body parts and so-
cial roles.40 It robs women of their subjectivity. Allen notes: 
Motherhood is not a matter of women's psychological or moral 
character. As an ideology by which men mark females as wo-
men, motherhood has nothing to do with a woman's selfishness 
or sacrifice, nurturance or non-violence. Motherhood has every-
thing to do with a history in which women remain powerless by 
reproducing the world of men and with a present in which wo-
men are expected to do the same.41 
35. ADRIENNE RlcH, Motherhood in Bondage, in ON Lrns, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SE-
LECTED PROSE 196 (1979); see RlcH, supra note 30, at 57. 
36. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 31, at 10. 
37. Rose M. Brewer, Theorizing Race, Class and Gender: The New Scholarship of 
Black Feminist Intellectuals and Black Women's Labor, in THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS: 
THE VISIONARY PRAGMATISM OF BLACK WoMEN 13, 24 (Stanlie M. James & Abena P.A. 
Busia eds., 1993) (noting also that the women upon whom this work falls disproportionately 
are Black). 
38. See RlcH, supra note 30, at 13; GORDON, supra note 31, at 10. 
39. RlcH, supra note 30, at 41-55. 
40. Jeffner Allen, Motherhood: The Annihilation of Women, in MOTHERING: EssAYS IN 
FEMINIST THEORY 315, 315-16, 320-25 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); FIRESTONE, supra note 
33, at 1-15. 
41. Allen, supra note 40, at 316; see also id. at 321 (regarding representational 
thinking). 
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Moreover, many feminist theorists have convincingly argued that the tradi-
tional view of motherhood is detrimental to women because it is, in fact, 
compulsory under patriarchy and as such contributes to women's 
oppression. 42 
At its core are both structures and an ideology that require mother-
hood as a prerequisite for all socially acceptable female adult roles.43 For 
example, psychoanalysts and psychologists have long believed that women 
have a maternal instinct.44 As a result, they have argued that women must 
mother in order to lead fulfilling lives, because the ability to nurture is 
natural or instinctual.45 To choose not to mother, then, is evidence of some 
deviation from the norm-a psychological disorder of sorts.46 In fact, in 
1963, noted childcare expert Dr. Benjamin Spock wrote that "any woman 
who finds full-time motherhood unfulfilling is showing 'a residue of diffi-
cult relationships in her own childhood.' "47 One result of this pronatalist 
ideology is that women are prevented from achieving their individual po-
tential. Adrienne Rich maintains: "Institutionalized motherhood demands 
42. RicH, supra note 30, at 43. Adrienne Rich defines patriarchy as "the power of the 
fathers: a familial-social, ideological, political system in which men-by force, direct pres-
sure, or through ritual, tradition, law, and language, customs, etiquette, education, and the 
division of labor, determine what part women shall or shall not play, and in which the 
female is everywhere subsumed under the male." Id. at 57. 
43. Martha E. Gimenez, Feminism, Pronatalism, and Motherhood, in MOTHERING: Es-
SAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 287, 289-90 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983) (agreeing with the argu-
ment developed by sociologist Judith Blake). 
44. CHoooRow, supra note 30, 21-22. 
45. Id. at 22. So Chodorow would suggest a solution to the continually reinforced sex-
ual division of labor: have both men and women "mother" or raise children. Id. at 178. But 
as Pauline Bart notes, the "requiring of both genders to raise children reinforces heterosexu-
ality and the nuclear family." Pauline Bart, Review of Chodorow's The Reproduction of 
Mothering, in MOTHERING: EssAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 147, 150 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 
1984). When Bart asked Chodorow "if her theory implied that children raised by two lesbi-
ans should be removed and put into a situation where there was a man present, [Chodorow] 
replied that the man did not have to be there all the time or be the biological father. But her 
theory does not suggest it could be the mailman." Id. 
46. See RicH, supra note 30, at 265-66 (discussing the false pathology of non-mothers); 
see also ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND 
THE PuRsurr OF HAPPINESS 129 (1995) (discussing the post-World War II environment that 
focused upon the nuclear family with children as the ultimate achievement of happiness and 
fulfillment that marginalized men and women who were childless). 
47. Benjamin Spock, Should Mothers Work?, LADIES' HoME J., Feb. 1963, quoted in 
Sandra L. Bern & Daryl J. Bern, Homogenizing the American Woman: The Power of an 
Unconscious Ideology, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL Accoums 
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN & MEN 6, 20 (Alison Jaggar & Paula Rothenberg eds., 
1978). Ladies' Home Journal has changed a bit with the times. In an article in its June 
1996 issue, it acknowledged that "maternal employment had no uniform effect on child 
development, because work is only one variable in a woman's life." Rosalind Barnett & 
Cary Rivers, Good News for Families, LADIES' HOME J., Jun. 1996, at 102, 102. 
94 Texas Journal of Women and the Law [Vol. 10:83 
of women maternal 'instinct' rather than intelligence, selflessness rather 
than self-realization, relation to others rather than creation of self."48 Simi-
larly, others have noted this pronatalist ideology renders equality unattaina-
ble.49 Sociologist Martha Gimenez notes: 
To be childless becomes synonymous with failure, and those 
feelings are reinforced by cultural and social pressure which con-
demn childlessness. The equation of motherhood with self-reali-
zation, in conjunction with the lack of desirable [or socially 
acceptable] alternatives ... make women's attainment of repro-
ductive freedom structurally impossible. "Self-determination 
cannot exist if none of the options is attractive."50 
Hence, under these conditions, motherhood is not freely chosen. As com-
pulsory and institutionalized, motherhood is designed to serve the interests 
of men and is a "burdensome condition that stifles [women's] creativity, 
exploits their labor, and makes them partners in their own oppression."51 
48. RicH, supra note 30, at 42. I do not believe that Rich argues here that mothers don't 
need intelligence to raise bright, well-adjusted children; rather, Rich asserts that in the 
socio-political institution of motherhood, women's intelligence is not what is valued. See 
also FIRESTONE supra note 33, at 232 (arguing that the "men and women developed only 
half of themselves, at the expense of the other half' because of the regulation of women to 
the domestic/maternal sphere); Roberts, supra note 30, at 5 (asserting that motherhood sub-
ordinates women by utilizing the woman's status as childbearer to determine identity and 
valuing that only in relation to the father). 
49. Gimenez, supra note 43, at 290 ("In contemporary society, pronatalism is structur-
ally and ideologically dominant at the societal and the personality structure levels of analy-
sis. In this context, statements which do not explicitly challenge pronatalism become 
implicitly supportive of it .... "). Gimenez defines pronatalism as "the existence of struc-
tural and ideological pressures resulting in socially prescribed parenthood as a precondition 
for all adult roles." Id. (emphasis omitted). 
50. Id. at 297 (quoting GoRDoN, supra note 31, at 408). Shulamith Firestone also as-
serts that pronatalism is dangerous to women. She argues that a woman can choose not to 
mother "only if she adds that she is neurotic, abnormal, childhating and therefore 'unfit.' .•• 
[U]ntil the decision not to have children is at least as legitimate as traditional childbearing, 
women are being forced into their female role [as mothers]." FIRESTONE, supra note 33, at 
228. 
51. COLLINS, supra note 6, at 118. Sociologist Martha Gimenez echoes this observa-
tion: ''The notion that all women should be and desire to be mothers has always been used 
to keep women in a subordinate position while paying lip service to the social importance of 
their role." Gimenez, supra note 43, at 287. 
The radical feminist critique of motherhood and the Black feminist position are in 
substantial opposition to the liberal feminist position that de-centers and de-genders the 
experience of motherhood in order to avoid the further marginalization of women. See 
Nadine Taub & Wendy W. Williams, Will Equality Require More than Assimilation, Ac-
commodation, or Separation from the Existing Social Structllre?, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 825, 
827 (1985) (noting that early feminist litigators used the strategy of insisting that gender 
differences are not inherent and physical sex differences are not absolute, as a way of re-
moving gendered stereotypes from the law); see also June Carbone & Margaret F. Bring, 
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The gendered division of labor in which men's labor is viewed as 
productive and women's labor is viewed as nonproductive and the resulting 
economic dominance of men in families is another essential ingredient of 
the social institution of motherhood. Economist Heidi Hartmann argues 
that job segregation by gender is the primary means by which the state 
maintains male gender hierarchy. She maintains that gender-based job 
segregation 
enforces lower wages for women in the labor market. Low 
wages keep women dependent on men because they encourage 
women to marry. Married women must perform domestic chores 
for their husbands. Men benefit, then, from both higher wages 
and the domestic division of labor. The domestic division of la-
bor, in tum, acts to weaken women's position in the labor mar-
ket. Thus, the hierarchical domestic division of labor is 
perpetuated by the labor market, and vice versa. 52 
Hence, the gendered division of labor is part and parcel of a system that 
encourages women to mother. It is integral in maintaining an institutional-
ized social motherhood and in maintaining women's dependence in 
families. 
B. Black Feminist Critiques of Motherhood 
Some feminists of color have rejected the radical feminist critique of 
motherhood and have instead adopted a pronatalist and matemalist posi-
tion, which views the institution of motherhood as both conveying adult 
status and empowering to women.53 Perhaps because African-American 
women often perform motherhood outside of marriage, African-American 
feminists generally have not discredited motherhood as an experience 
Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Refonn, 65 TUL. 
L. REv. 953, 983 (1991) (mentioning that liberal feminism encouraged women to devalue 
their domestic roles); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining 
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 46 (1991) (noting that some feminists have 
tried to de-center motherhood from women's identity). 
52. Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex, in THE SIGNS 
REA.DER: WoMEN, GENDER & SCHOLARSHIP 193, 195 (Elizabeth Abel & Emily K. Abel 
eds., 1983); see also FIRESTONE, supra note 33. 
53. Historian Molly Ladd-Taylor defines maternalism in part as a 
specific ideology whose adherents hold (1) that there is a uniquely feminine value 
system based in care and nurturance; (2) that mothers perform a service to the 
state by raising citizen-workers; [and] (3) that women are united across class, 
race, and nation by their common capacity for motherhood and therefore share a 
responsibility for all the world's children[.] 
MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE STATE, 1890-
1930 3 (1994). 
96 Texas Journal of Women and the Law [Vol. 10:83 
shaped almost exclusively by patriarchal or male requirements.s4 Indeed, 
African-American scholar bell hooks has argued: 
Some white middle class, college-educated women argued that 
motherhood was a serious obstacle to women's liberation ... 
Had black women voiced their views on motherhood, it would 
have not been named a serious obstacle to our freedom as wo-
men. Racism, availability of jobs, lack of skills or education and 
a number of other issues would have been at the top of the 
list-but not motherhood.ss 
In addition, sociologist Patricia Hill Collins has asserted that the insti-
tution of motherhood is not demeaning or dangerous to African-American 
women due to the differences in the cultures of Black and White Ameri-
cans. s6 The mothering patterns of African-American women were passed 
down from West African foremothers as well as from the forced patterns of 
mothering under slavery wherein elderly women (othermothers and fictive 
kin)s7 cared for slave children who were too young to work in the fields.ss 
In the context of slavery, Black mothering was in many ways a subversive 
activity. Angela Davis argues that by mothering their own children, as 
well as the children of other slave women, slave women performed "the 
only labor of the slave community which could not be directly and immedi-
ately claimed by the oppressor."s9 Moreover, Collins argues that contem-
porary African-American culture has in large part rejected the cultural 
normalcy of the nuclear family in favor of a familial structure that includes 
and promotes othermothering and kinship networks that thereby provide 
mothers with the social support necessary to mother their children without 
54. According to the 1990 Census, Black "female householders with no husband pre-
sent" who had children under eighteen years of age headed 26.95% of all Black families 
counted by the Census. By comparison, White "female householders with no husband pre-
sent" who had children under eighteen years of age headed 6.40% of all White families 
counted. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENsus OF POPULA-
TION: SocIAL A.No EcoNoM1c CHARACTERISTICS, UNITED STATES 41 (1993) [hereinafter 
1990 CENSUS]. 
55. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 133 (1984). 
56. See COLLINS, supra note 6, at 119-23. 
57. Collins describes othermothers as "women who assist blood mothers by sharing 
mothering responsibilities." Id. at 119. 
58. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LoVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK 
AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 29 (1985); see also Stanlie M. James, 
Mothering: A possible Black feminist link to social transfonnation?, in THEORIZING BLACK 
FEMINISMS: THE VISIONARY PRAGMATISM OF BLACK WOMEN 44, 46 (Stanlie M. James & 
Abena P.A. Busia eds., 1993) (noting the West African patterns of shared childcare in poly-
gynous households and the high incidence of fostering children in West African culture). 
59. Angela Y. Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of 
Slaves, reprinted in THE ANGELA Y. DAVIS READER 111, 116 (Joy James ed., 1998). 
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detriment to their social, economic, or political selves.6° Furthermore, Col-
lins states: 
[M]otherhood can serve as a site where Black women express 
and learn the power of self-definition, the importance of valuing 
and respecting ourselves, the necessity of self-reliance and inde-
pendence, and the belief in Black women's empowerment. . . . 
Others see motherhood as providing a base for self-actualization, 
status in the Black community, and a catalyst for social 
activism.61 
To be sure, African-American women have used their position as mothers, 
othermothers, and community mothers to work toward racial equality, the 
eradication of drugs in Black communities, and community development.62 
Notwithstanding Collins' analysis, other African-American feminists 
have noted that pronatalism and matemalism in the Black community is a 
response to the impoverished conditions under which Black women often 
live. They have argued that the lack of access to educational and employ-
60. Collins does not completely ignore the costs of pronatal ideology to Black women, 
see CoLUNs, supra note 6, at 133-37, but she does not explore this in detail. See also 
Sylvia Sims Gray & Lynn M. Nybell, Issues in African-American Family Preservation, 69 
CHILD WELFARE 513, 515-17 (1990) (noting the importance of extended family networks in 
the African-American community); Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical 
Study of Black Single Mothers and Their Families, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMI· 
NISM AND LEGAL THEORY 171, 179 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 
1991) (explaining that the extended family structure permitted Black survival and resistance 
during slavery). 
61. CoLLJNS, supra note 6, at 118; see also JOYCE LADNER, TOMORROW'S TOMORROW: 
THE BLACK WOMAN 215-39 (1971) (noting that in the African-American community, moth-
erhood is central in or out of wedlock, and single mothers are supported rather than viewed 
as immoral). 
62. "Lifting as We Climb," the motto of the National Association of Colored Women, 
can be understood as women seeking to lift the African-American community out of despair 
while bettering themselves and is but one example of othermothering and community moth-
ering at work. See BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 433-36 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1973); 
see also Eileen Boris, The Power of Motherhood: Black and White Activist Women Redefine 
the "Political," 2 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 25, 41 (1989) ("Local [Black women's] clubs 
practiced a larger social motherhood that provided necessary services to the community. 
They established kindergartens, old age homes, working girls' lodgings, social purity 
projects, female protective leagues, orphanages and settlements."). For a contemporary use 
of African-American mothering as a model for political action, see Dorothy E. Roberts, The 
Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. Rsv. 871 (1994); Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting 
the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing about Motherhood, in REPRESENTATIONS 
OF MOTHERHOOD 56, 59 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994) (noting that motherwork goes 
beyond family survival and recognizing that individual survival requires group survival). 
See also EUZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WoMAN: PROBLEMS OF ExcLusION IN FEMI-
NIST THOUGHT 132 (1988) (stating that "for Blacks in America the family has been a source 
of resistance against white oppression"); STACK, supra note 6, at 124-29 (suggesting ex-
tended family networks as a source of resistance against White oppression). 
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ment advancement that has plagued the African-American community has 
shaped Black women's perspectives on motherhood. Children are valued 
because they are the only things a Black woman can call her own and 
because motherhood is viewed as one of few goals that she can achieve 
that signifies maturity.63 
III. The Requirements of Institutionalized Motherhood 
The primary role of women is in the home and family . . . men 
still need a good mother to come to with their little troubles. 
Women should provide a place of refuge where the husband and 
children can return from a busy, confused and complex world. 
-Belle Spafford, President, Women's Auxiliary, Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints64 
The legal responsibilities of a wife are to live in the home estab-
lished by her husband; to peiform the domestic chores (cleaning, 
cooking, washing, etc.) necessary to help maintain that home; to 
care for her husband and children. 
The legal responsibilities of a husband are to provide a 
home for his wife and children; to support, protect and maintain 
his wife and children. 65 
A. The Popular Institution of Motherhood: Nineteenth Century Roots 
We are inundated with the popular view of motherhood, which is part 
of the cultural paradigm of the nuclear family. In the popular view, the 
best mothers are those who are White, heterosexual, well-educated, well-
63. See LADNER, supra note 61, at 217; Ann Chandler Howell, Book Review, 34 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 561 (1972) (reviewing JoYCE LADNER, TOMORROW'S TOMORROW: THE 
BLACK WOMAN (1971)); see also RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LIITLE Susrn: SINGLE PREO· 
NANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE v. WADE 81 (1992). 
Maya Angelou has written of this cultural understanding surrounding motherhood, 
even teenage motherhood, as signifying adult status. She writes that when leaving home at 
the age of seventeen with her infant child, her mother stated: "Alright, you're a woman. 
You don't have a husband, but you've got a three-month old baby. I just want you to 
remember one thing. From the moment you leave this house, don't let anybody raise 
you .... You've been raised." Maya Angelou, Forward to DouBLE STITCH: BLACK WOMEN 
WRITE ABoUT MOTHERS AND DAUGHTERS, at xi (Patricia Bell-Scott et al. eds., 1991). 
64. Quoted in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE 
RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 292 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 
1978). 
65. RICHARD T. GALLEN, WIVES' LEGAL RIGHTS 4-5 (1967) (quoted in Sheila Cronan, 
Marriage, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL AccouNTS OF THE RE. 
LATIONS BETWEEN WoMEN AND MEN 329, 331 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg 
eds., 1978)). 
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off, and married.66 ''The archetypal white, middle-class nuclear family di-
vides family life into two oppositional spheres: the 'male' sphere of eco-
nomic providing and the 'female' sphere of affective nurturing."67 Women 
in this paradigm are expected to mother.68 In fact, images of female self-
fulfillment through mothering are everywhere. On television, in 
magazines, and in popular discourse we see the joys of motherhood: nurs-
ing to satiate an infant, watching the toddler's first steps, guiding children 
through the first experiences of independence, attending graduations, and 
the teary but ultimately satisfying guidance of children into marriage and 
childrearing. Under this popular view, motherhood is the central compo-
nent of the female sphere: it is the sphere where women are expected and 
encouraged to exert influence.69 
Our current conception of motherhood and the importance of the nu-
clear family has its origins in the industrial revolution and the urbanization 
of the nineteenth century. Indeed the institution of motherhood was dra-
matically transformed during this period.70 Nineteenth-century technology 
made it possible for goods to be produced in greater quantities outside of 
the household, where men, women, and children formerly worked together 
in the household to produce goods.71 In the more affluent classes, men 
followed production, working for money outside of the home, while wo-
men were left at home to care for the needs of the men and children.72 By 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, capitalism and industriali-
zation created male workers and male-dominated labor unions. These in-
stitutions ultimately fashioned paid labor as "men's work" and housework 
as "women's work," forcing all but the poorest women out of the paid 
66. See. e.g .. Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, The Content of Mother Stereo-
types, 32 SEX ROLES 495, 496 (1995) ("North American culture defines the 'most appropri-
ate' mothers as heterosexual, stay-at-home mothers in first marriage, nuclear families."). 
67. COLLINS, supra note 6, at 46. 
68. CHODOROW, supra note 30, at 38-39. 
69. We, of course, also see this view of woman as mothers in the law. See, e.g., Muller 
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 
(1872) (Bradley, J. concurring). 
70. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED: A HISTORICAL OVER-
VIEW 33 (1981). 
71. Id. 
72. This is not to say that many women did not work for money. Poor women worked 
as domestics in the homes of the affluent, in factories, at home doing piece work, as farm 
workers, and as prostitutes, and in the antebellum South, Black women worked as slaves. 
See ROSALYN BAXANDALL ET AL., AMERicA's WoRKING WoMEN: A DocuMENTARY H1s-
TORY 1600 TO THE PRESENT 94 (1995) (stating that the family wage system was a myth 
because only a minority of men earned enough money to enable their wives and children to 
refrain from paid labor). On the transformation of childhood, see Janet L. Dolgin, Trans-
forming Childhood: Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1113, 1149 
(1997). 
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labor market. The development of protective legislation, child labor laws, 
intensified segregation of the labor force, and the creation of the family 
wage solidified the exclusion of women as acceptable competitors in the 
labor market.73 According to Heidi Hartmann, capitalists and American-
born White male labor unions collaborated in creating the family wage, 
which was integral in protecting men's patriarchal position in the family 
and in providing capitalists with the unpaid labor of housewives, which 
produced and maintained healthier workers.74 As a result, the family wage 
"performed two functions for patriarchal control: it cut competition from 
women wage workers, and it allowed men to keep their wives at home to 
provide personal services, services that are not so easily forthcoming when 
women have to deal with the problems of the second shift."75 
Nevertheless, the new economic system grew to depend heavily on 
poor women's paid labor in the market. The emerging industrialists 
needed cheap labor to keep their operations profitable. These early indus-
trialists filled their need for cheap labor by hiring young, single women 
from farming communities, housing them in supervised dormitories and 
boarding houses, protecting the women's reputations for virtue, and by 
proxy protecting the working women's marriageability.76 By 1840, wo-
men comprised approximately one half of all workers in manufacturing 
jobs and ninety percent of all workers in shoe factories, textile mills, and 
milling shops.77 Later, nineteenth century capitalists, led by market forces, 
eliminated the prior supervision of women workers, reduced wages for wo-
men, lengthened the women's working hours, and increased the pace of 
women's industrial work.78 These changed conditions decreased the status 
of factory work, making the work socially unacceptable for middle-class 
White women and other women "of good moral character."79 Manufactur-
73. Natalie J. Sokoloff, Mothenvork and Working Mothers, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: 
ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 
259, 259 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 2nd ed. 1984). 
74. Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a 
More Progressive Union, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: A D1scuss10N OF THE UNHAPPY 
MARRIAGE OF MARx!sM AND FEMINISM 1, 20-23 (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981). 
75. Ann Ferguson, On Conceiving Motherhood and Sexuality: A Feminist Materialist 
Approach, in MOTHERING: EssAYs IN FEMINIST THEORY 153, 171 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 
1983). 
76. MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 
FROM CoLONIAL TIMES TO THE PREsENT 109 (1988); see also NANCY F. Corr, THE BoNDS 
OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 35-39 (1977). 
77. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 76, at 122. 
78. See KESsLER-IIARRis, supra note 70, at 59. 
79. See id. at 60-62; Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of 
Women in the Age of Jackson, in OUR AMERICAN SISTERS: WOMEN IN AMERICAN LIFE AND 
THOUGHT 82, 89-90 (Jean E. Friedman & William G. Shade eds., 1973) (noting that indus-
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ing work became the work of the lower-class, poor native-born, and immi-
grant workers. 80 
It was in this economic milieu that the culturally accepted role of wo-
men both as women and as mothers dramatically changed. The new role 
that emerged at this time was shaped by what historians call the "cult of 
domesticity" or the "cult of true womanhood."81 The ideological founda-
tion for this new role lay in the belief that motherhood was women's natu-
ral role in the family.82 ''This new ideology emphasized her biological 
features-womb and breast-and allegedly innate maternal instincts for the 
social role of mothering."83 In this new role, each woman was charged 
with sustaining a happy and orderly household and with giving her hus-
band the "services he needed to sustain his work life."84 As historian Alice 
Kessler-Harris notes: 
The moral imperative that confined women to their homes served 
many purposes. . . . It kept most married women and many un-
married women out of the labor force, restricting them to sup-
portive roles in relation to the male work force. It offered 
industry the services of an unpaid labor force at home whose 
primary task was to stretch male wages. It helped to ensure that 
those women who did earn wages would stay in the labor force 
only briefly, remaining primarily committed to their families and 
satisfied with low-paid jobs.85 
Perhaps more importantly, the greatest-if not the only-calling of wo-
men under the cult of domesticity was raising children with good moral 
trialization increased differences between women of different social classes and that the 
image of the lady was accepted as the ideal of femininity-an ideal which poor women could 
not achieve). 
80. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 76, at 110. 
81. E.g., KEssLER-HARrus, supra note 70, at 67. 
82. One important proponent of this social order was author and educator Catharine 
Beecher. Although Beecher was unlike many of her contemporaries in that she did not 
believe that women were naturally subordinate, she believed that women should embrace 
the subordinate role because women's subordination and exclusion from the public sphere 
promoted the general good of society. See KATHRYN KlsH SKLAR, CATHARINE BEECHER: A 
STUDY IN AMERICAN DOMESTICITY 158 (1973). 
83. Sokoloff, supra note 73, at 260. 
84. KEssLER-HARRis, supra note 70, at 35. 
85. Id. at 67. Natalie Sokoloff also notes: 
The elements of this new ideology that had to be asserted as "natural" were (1) 
children require full-time, undivided adult attention, (2) women are specially en-
dowed to provide this care, and care for the homes their husbands need to ensure 
the reproduction of their labor power; and (3) domesticity not only shields women 
from the evils of the outside world, but also brings them certain rewards of status 
which are mediated through their families. 
Sokoloff, supra note 73, at 260. 
102 Texas Journal of Women and the Law [Vol. 10:83 
values.86 As Kessler-Harris states: "Meek and passive, modest and silent, 
women were expected to submerge their wills into those of their husbands 
and fathers. Piety, purity and submissiveness became the ideals. Women 
could fulfill these precepts only within the home."87 Indeed, in 1872, Jus-
tice Bradley stated in a concurring opinion to Bradwell v. Illinois,88 a case 
that denied Myra Bradwell the opportunity to practice law in the state of 
Illinois: ''The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] 
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the 
Creator."89 
The values of the cult of domesticity were first articulated by women 
and men of the middle class and received essentially universal acceptance 
by White women and men of the working class. However, these values 
could never be realized among women of the working class.90 The stan-
dards of the cult of domesticity taught that only women who stayed home 
(and who were not wage laborers) could instill the values of sexual and 
moral purity in their husbands and children. Because poverty prevented 
working-class women from giving up their paid labor, they could never 
become women of high moral character or acceptable mothers by the social 
standards.91 
86. The author of an 1842 domestic education treatise stated, "To American mothers is 
then committed, in a special manner, the solemn responsibility of watching over the hearts 
and minds of our youthful citizens who are soon to take their places in the public arena 
... ,"quoted in ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 76, at 117. 
87. KEssLER-HAruus, supra note 70, at 38; see also ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 76, at 
112. As a writer expressed in 1886: 
For motherhood is the crown and glory of a woman's life. It comes sometimes as 
a thorny crown, but it is worth all it costs. The blessing of motherhood, which is 
like nothing on earth, is placed in compensation over against all the pain and care 
which so often seem to be woman's peculiar burden. And it compensates. 
L.W. PALMER, The Coming Guest, BABYHOOD 2, 313 (1886), quoted in Rima D. Apple, 
Constructing Mothers: Scientific Motherhood in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 8 
Soc. HIST. MED. 161, 165 (1995). 
88. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
89. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
90. Ferguson, supra note 75, at 170-76; see also Apple, supra note 87, at 165) (empha· 
sizing that despite the labors and successes of women in various fields, women should not 
lose sight of the central focuses of womanhood and motherhood). 
91. See Ferguson, supra note 75, at 170. 
In the eighteenth century, women and children were expected to earn enough money to 
subsist, and men's wages were adjusted in accordance with this presumption. Laura J. 
Owen, The Welfare of Women in Laboring Families: England, 1860-1950, 1 FEMINIST 
STUD. 107, 108 (1973). But with the implementation of the family wage, whereby some 
men could earn enough to support a non-wage earning wife and non-wage earning children, 
and protective legislation, some married working-class women who could stay home with 
their children gained power as mothers. Simultaneously, these women lost power by their 
economic dependence on men. Ferguson, supra note 75, at 171. As for those women who 
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Paradoxically, the cult of true womanhood depended on the waged 
labor of poor women who produced the goods consumed by the middle and 
upper classes. A contradiction also existed in the way poor working wo-
men were treated by the factory owners and members of the middle and 
upper classes. The female biology and the corresponding needs of working 
women, such as menstruation, childbirth, nursing, and childrearing, were 
entirely disregarded by those who employed these women.92 Conse-
quently, the cult of domesticity glorified the nuclear family and women's 
position in it while leaving women in the lower classes, who were respon-
sible for supporting themselves and their families, outside the definitions of 
respectable women and good mothers. 
B. Contemporary Rhetoric of True Womanhood 
The nineteenth century construction of motherhood continues to influ-
ence our current understanding of the proper role of women in society. For 
example, in one study, sociologists found that survey subjects viewed mar-
ried mothers as having the most positive personality traits when compared 
to women in general, divorced mothers, step-mothers, and never-married 
mothers.93 Married mothers were viewed as more forgiving, caring, warm, 
generous, and protective than were women generally.94 And when com-
pared with other mothers, married mothers were seen as better parents who 
always put their children's needs first. Never-married mothers were char-
acterized as "unpleasant people who possess many negative and few posi-
tive personal traits."95 In addition, never-married mothers were 
stereotyped as unhappy, deviant, and with poor childrearing abilities.96 
These women were more likely than married, divorced, or step-mothers to 
be characterized as irresponsible, stupid, drug abusers, or unsuccessful par-
ents.97 Additionally, conservative social commentators have gone so far as 
to blame crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare, and homelessness on 
were forced to work outside their homes, the cult of domesticity left them vulnerable to the 
consequences of being outside the acceptance of society, including legitimized sexual vio-
lence. Id. at 170. 
92. Sokoloff, supra note 73, at 261. 
93. Ganong & Coleman, supra note 66, at 501-08. 
94. Id. at 507. 
95. Id. at 508. 
96. Id. This attitude can be seen daily in the rhetoric surrounding women who receive 
public assistance and their children. For a fuller discussion, see MARTIIA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 106-18 (1995). 
97. Ganong & Coleman, supra note 66, at 510. 
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single mothers.98 Hence, the stereotypes defining both married mother-
hood and never-married motherhood reinforce the notion that women's 
proper role is that of married mother, or motherhood within patriarchal 
norms.99 
In addition to establishing a rigid hierarchy of status among mothers, 
proponents of the traditional nuclear family continue to promote the nine-
teenth-century ideology favoring women's primary role in the home. Ad-
vocates assert that there exist biological or important social grounds for the 
traditional division of labor between men and women, wherein women are 
responsible for all household chores, including childcare, while men are 
responsible for earning a family wage and providing physical protection for 
the family. I 00 This traditional view of women's proper role posits that the 
mother-child bond-and only the mother can make this bond-is important 
for the proper emotional development of children. IOI Indeed, some popular 
books have even suggested that mothers should stay home with their chil-
dren in order to ensure the children's healthy emotional development. 102 
And although more married men currently help with household chores and 
childcare than at any other time in our history, male assistance is viewed as 
just that-assisting women with their household responsibilities. 103 
98. Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at Al4 
(contending that illegitimacy is a new trend among Whites that threatens the United States). 
99. See Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 346 
(1996) ("The single mother defies ideas of traditional sexual morality •.. because she is a 
mother outside of marriage."); see generally Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 
18 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 19 (1995). 
100. Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg, Applying the Frameworks: Family, in 
FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF TIIE RELATIONS BE· 
TWEEN WoMEN AND MEN 292, 293-94 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 2nd 
ed. 1984). 
101. Lionel Tiger & Robin Fox, Mother-Child Bonding, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS 226 
(Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 2nd ed. 1984). 
102. See, e.g., PENELOPE LEACH, CHILDREN FIRST (1994). But see Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a)(l), 
110 Stat. 2105, 2131 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.) (mandating that women 
receiving public assistance under this federal program return to work within two years of 
the child's birth). The continued influence of nineteenth-century ideology on our contem-
porary thinking about motherhood is evident in the persistence of "mother-guilt" and 
"mother-blaming" in both popular and scientific literature. For example, one study analyz-
ing mother-blaming in major medical journals found that during 1970, 1976, and 1982, 
seventy-two different types of psychopathology in children had been attributed to their 
mothers. Paula J. Caplan & Ian Hall-McCorquodale, Mother-Blaming in Major Clinical 
Journals, 55 AMER. J. 0RTIIOPSYCHIAT. 345, 347-49 (1985) (noting the pathologies attrib-
uted to poor mothering, including absence of genitality, delusions, transsexualism, and ul-
cerative colitis). 
103. Jerry Adler, Building a Better Dad, NEWSWEEK, Jun. 17, 1996, at 58, 61 (citing 
studies that indicate that American fathers spend an average of forty-five minutes per day 
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Contemporary relational feminist theorists, such as Carol Gilligan, 
have continued the discourse of women as nurturing by describing women 
as speaking and behaving, psychologically, with "a different voice."104 
According to this theory, women really are different from men. Women 
are marked as nurturers because they define themselves through their rela-
tionships with others.105 Conversely, men are marked as conceptual or the-
oretical thinkers, who define themselves individually rather than through 
their relation to others.106 Although Gilligan's purpose was to "reverse the 
previous practice of ignoring women altogether, or treating any differences 
between men and women as reflecting women's inadequacy,"107 the rela-
tional feminists' understanding of women fits into traditional stereotypes of 
women and their proper role as mothers and caretakers. As Professor Joan 
Williams notes, these relational feminists "reclaim the compliments of Vic-
torian gender ideology while rejecting its insults."108 Hence, like the pro-
ponents of the cult of domesticity, relational feminists assert that women 
are more nurturing than men, "less tied to the questionable virtues of capi-
talism, and ultimately more moral than men."109 Unlike the cult of domes-
caring for their children by themselves while American mothers spend more than ten hours 
per day caring for their children); Abby Margolis Newman, Chore Wars, WORKING 
MOTIIER, Sept. 2000, at 84, 86 (citing the National Study of the Changing Workforce, Fam-
ilies and Work Institute, which indicates that married working mothers spend approximately 
one hour a day more on parenting and household chores than married working fathers). 
104. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENCE VOICE 24-63 (1982). Although Gilligan 
seems to suggest that the differences in the moral development of women and men are 
biological, she states: 
No claims are made about the origins of the differences described or their distri-
bution in a wider population, across cultures, or through time. Clearly, these dif-
ferences arise in a social context where factors of social status and power combine 
with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males and females and rela-
tions between the sexes. 
Id. at 2. 
105. Id. at 159-60 (stating that women describe themselves in reference to relationships, 
such as wife and mother); see also CHoDoRow, supra note 30, at 178 (stating that women in 
our society are defined in relation to others, whereas men are defined in occupational 
terms). 
106. GILLIGAN, supra note 104, at 160-63 (claiming that men describe themselves in 
terms of personal achievement); see also Nancy Chodorow, Gender Personality and the 
Sexual Sociology of Adult Life, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL Ac-
COUNTS oF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 358 (Alison Jaggar & Paula Roth-
enberg eds., 2nd ed. 1984) (stating that sexually differentiated personality types that result 
from exclusive female parenting are well adapted for the perpetuation of capitalism and 
patriarchy). 
107. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 802 n.12 (1989). 
108. Id. at 807; see also Nel Noddings, Ethics from the Standpoint of Women, in THEO-
RETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 160 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (defend-
ing the construction of female ethics based on women's traditional role as nurturers). 
109. Williams, supra note 107, at 807. 
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ticity proponents, however, modem relational feminists do not perceive 
women as more passive, less competent, and more timid than men. 110 
Nevertheless, relational feminists, like their predecessors, often sup-
port matemalism as a political strategy.111 As Professor Lisa Brush notes: 
The argument is that mother-work involves meeting children's 
needs for protection, nurturance, and moral training. To protect, 
nurture, and train children, mothers must have access to the con-
ditions that will allow them to flourish as persons: bodily integ-
rity, moral autonomy, material security, relational integrity, and 
political efficacy.112 
In fact the institution of motherhood continues to be an acceptable platform 
from which women may be politically active. 113 
C. Black Mothers Are "De Mules Uh De World": Motherhood and 
Work; Racism and Ideology 
De nigger woman is de mule uh de world so fur as Ah can see. 114 
110. Id. 
111. Lisa D. Brush, Love, Toil, and Trouble: Motherhood and Feminist Politics, 21 
SIGNS 429, 430 (1996) ("Matemalists claim entitlements to citizenship rights and benefits 
on the basis of mother-work as a source of women's political personhood."). 
112. Id.; cf. Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, in MoTIIERING: EssAYS IN FEMINIST THE-
ORY 213, 226 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983) ("[W]e must work to bring ... maternal thought in 
the public realm, to make the preservation and growth of all children a work of public 
conscience and legislation."). 
113. See, e.g., Linda Schott, The Women's Peace Party and The Moral Basis of Women's 
Pacifism, 8 FRONTIERS 22-24 (1985) (discussing how the World War I-era Women's Peace 
Party, founded in 1915, used maternal rhetoric to protest and perhaps stall the United States' 
entrance into World War I); Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Mothers of the Disappeared: Pas-
sion and Protest in Maternal Action, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTIIERHOOD 75 (Donna 
Bassin et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the activism of mothers, many of whose children had 
been "disappeared," murdered, or tortured by the Argentine military or government); Julia 
Wells, Maternal Politics in Organizing Black South African Women: The Historical Les-
sons, in SISTERHOOD, FEMINISMS AND POWER: FROM AFRICA TO TIIE DIASPORA 251 (Obi-
oma Nnaemeka ed., 1998) (observing that in South Africa, Black mothers organized anti-
pass campaigns that were understood as grounded in women's role as mothers and protec-
tors of their children). 
114. ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING Goo (Perennial Classics 
1998) (1937). In this work depicting the harsh life of African-Americans in the South, the 
grandmother explains to her young granddaughter the social position of African-American 
women in the United States: 
Honey, de white man is de ruler of everything as fur as Ah been able tub find out. 
Maybe it's some place way off in de ocean where de black man is in power, but 
we don't know nothin' but what we see. So de white man throw down de load 
and tell de nigger man tub pick it up. He pick it up because he have to, but he 
don't tote it. He hand it to his womenfolks. De nigger woman is de mule uh de 
2001] Nurturing in the Service of White Culture 107 
1. African-American Women and the Cult of True Womanhood 
Although the cult of true womanhood normalized the experiences and 
aspirations of White middle-class women and men, Black middle-class wo-
men and men also aspired to live by the dogma of the cult of domestic-
ity .115 For example, a Black newspaper editorial defined the primary role 
of Black women as caretakers of Black men: 
Women are not formed for the great cares themselves, but to 
soften ours. Their tenderness is the proper reward for the dan-
gers we undergo for their preservation. They are confined within 
the narrow limits of domestic assiduity, and when they stray be-
yond them, they move out of their proper sphere and conse-
quently without grace.116 
Professor Peggy Cooper Davis has noted that Black abolitionists who em-
braced the cult of domesticity for African-American women did so in part 
to "relieve black women of the drudgery of manual labor outside their 
homes and 'elevate' them."117 And indeed, after emancipation, some 
Black women retired from field labor and devoted their energies to their 
domestic chores. Undoubtedly, these women were severely criticized by 
Whites for "aspiring to a model of womanhood that was considered inap-
propriate for them."118 Nevertheless, early African-American activist Ma-
ria Stewart encouraged Black women to use their special abilities as 
women/mothers to influence the public sphere: 
0 ye mothers, what a responsibility rests on you! You have souls 
committed to your charge . . . . It is you that must create in the 
minds of your little girls and boys a thirst for knowledge, the 
love of virtue ... and the cultivation of a pure heart.119 
In the late nineteenth century, Black middle-class clubwomen created 
mothers' organizations to assist working-class African-American women. 
The philosophy of the cult of domesticity was the philosophy of the club 
movement. These clubwomen counseled Black women to assume the re-
world so fur as Ah can see. Ah been prayin' fur it tuh be different wid you. 
Lawd, Lawd, Lawd! 
Id. at 14. 
115. DOROTHY STERLING, WE ARE YOUR SISTERS: BLACK WOMEN IN TIIE NINETEENTII 
CENTURY 220 (1984). 
116. Id. (citation omitted). 
117. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY v AL-
OES 24 (1997). 
118. Bonnie Thorton Dill, Our Mother's Grief: Racial Ethnic Women and the Mainte-
nance of Families, 13 J. FAM. HisT. 415, 422 (1988). 
119. MARIA W. STEWART, AMErucA's FIRST BLACK WoMAN PoLmcAL WRITER: EssAYS 
AND SPEECHES 35 (Marilyn Richardson ed., 1987). 
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sponsibility for the moral, religious, and social development of their chil-
dren. Black women were "to train their children for God, teach them 
values rather than good dress, and make a happy, clean, comfortable but 
not luxurious home."120 
Paradoxically, these Black activists who supported the dictates of do-
mesticity also recognized that the cult of domesticity was rooted in the 
racist subordination of African-American people, including the conditions 
of Black women under slavery and the stereotypes those conditions helped 
to create. Therefore, these women consciously included themselves in the 
cult of domesticity as a subversive form of protest to these oppressive ste-
reotypes. As Professor Eileen Boris explains: 
Because black women stood outside the boundaries of "true wo-
manhood," as defined by the dominant culture, by being black 
and descended from slaves ... , black activists' references to 
"highest womanhood," to "true motherhood," appeared to sub-
vert a social script written for them by the larger culture that 
sought to deny them the possibility of nurturing, motherhood, 
and family maintenance. That is, words that seemed to reflect 
the hegemonic culture, that seemed to suggest a consciousness 
steeped in a limited domesticity, in fact challenged that dominant 
culture. 121 
Motherhood under the cult of domesticity also required chastity and 
sexual modesty, two traits that White culture had not afforded to African-
American women. 122 Nevertheless, the institution of motherhood has 
within it a specific definition of African-American motherhood. This defi-
nition is enforced through particular social constraints and constructs, such 
as the devaluation of Black women's sexuality and the othermothering of 
White people. 
One facet of racist domination supported by the cult of domesticity 
vis-a-vis Black women was the exoticization and devaluation of African-
American female sexuality. Black women were thought of as lacking sex-
ual morality. 123 As a result of these stereotypes regarding Black female 
120. Boris, supra note 62, at 37-38. 
121. Id. at 30. 
122. In fact, the dominant culture little afforded Black slave women the "alleged benefits 
of the ideology of the family." Davis, supra note 59, at 116. "In order to function as slave, 
the black woman had to be annulled as woman, that is, as woman in her historical stance of 
wardship under the entire male hierarchy." Id. This attitude extended even in the realm of 
Black motherhood. Id. at 117. 
123. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN & FEMINISM 54 (1981) 
(suggesting that the stereotype of Black womanhood is based on a belief that "all black 
women were immoral and sexually loose"). 
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sexuality, the rape of a Black woman was not considered criminal. 124 
Moreover, the rape of Black women under slavery is a history that has 
since been intentionally retold by the larger community as a story of Black 
female sexual promiscuity.125 The common view of Black female sexuality 
is illustrated in the court's opinion in Daltas v. State126 in 1918: 
What has been said by some of our courts about an unchaste 
female in our country being a comparatively rare exception is no 
doubt true where the population is composed largely of the Cau-
casian race, but we would be blind ourselves to actual conditions 
if we adopted this rule where another race that is largely unmoral 
constitutes an appreciable part of the population. 127 
And, as Angela Davis has noted, the myth of Black male sexual violence 
towards White women, the myth of the Black rapist, has always been com-
plemented by 
its inseparable companion: the image of the Black woman as 
chronically promiscuous. For once the notion is accepted that 
Black men harbor irresistible and animal-like sexual urges, the 
124. See id.; Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 HAR.v. WoMEN's L.J. 103, 
118 (1983); see also Davis, supra note 59, at 123-25; Roberts, supra note 30, at 8 (contend-
ing that slave women were compelled to replenish their master's supply of slaves with their 
children). As Barbara Omolade notes: 
To [the White slave owner, the Black female slave] was a fragmented commodity 
whose feelings and choices were rarely considered .... Her vagina, used for his 
sexual pleasure, was the gateway to the womb, which was his place of capital 
investment-the capital investment being the sex act and the resulting child the 
accumulated surplus, worth money on the slave market. 
Barbara Omolade, Hearts of Darkness, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE PoLmcs OF SEXUALITY 
350, 354 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983). Additionally, the rape of a Black female slave by a 
Black male was not criminal either. In 1859, in George v. State, 37 Miss. 316 (1859), a 
Mississippi appellate court overturned the conviction of a Black man who had raped a ten 
year-old girl slave, concluding that "there is no act which embraces either the attempted or 
actual commission of a rape by a slave on a female slave." Id. at 320; see also A. Leon 
Higginbotham, Jr., The Hill-Thomas Hearings. What Took Place and What Happened: 
White Male Domination, Black Male Domination, and the Denigration of Black Women, in 
RAcE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA 26, 31 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan 
eds., 1995) (commenting on George v. State). 
125. Even after emancipation, Black women were not protected against rape, because 
they were considered, by nature, promiscuous. For example, in 1873 the Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction of a Black man for the rape of a Black woman, noting that 
while the perpetrator's behavior was "extremely reprehensible, and deserving of punish-
ment, [it] does not involve him in the crime which this statute was designed to punish." 
Christian v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 954, 959 (1873); see also A. LEON HIGGIN-
BOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM 102-04 (1996) (explaining that Black women were 
never considered "ladies" because of their race). 
126. 79 So. 690 (Fla. 1918). 
127. Id. at 691. 
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entire race is invested with bestiality. If Black men have their 
eyes on white women as sexual objects, then Black women must 
certainly welcome the sexual attentions of white men.128 
This stereotype regarding Black women's sexual availability and sexual 
deviance prevented African-American women from being mothers in terms 
.that the proponents of domesticity understood; they could never be moral 
authorities to their children. 
Although Black women could never be righteous mothers to their own 
children, they could be used to mother others, as long as those mothering 
relationships were constrained or supervised by Whites. Under this con-
ception of Black womanhood, Black women could be called on to care for 
the children of "real" women as servants, wet nurses, and the like. 129 Ann 
Ferguson notes that this phenomenon created the "second part of the stere-
otype of black women as mothers ... as servants caring for (white) chil-
dren" under the strict moral supervision of White women. 130 The current 
discourse of the welfare reform debates also reflects a belief in the failure 
of Black women to meet the dictates of the cult of domesticity. This dis-
course describes African-American women as mothering poorly; they are 
matriarchs who are responsible for the demasculinization of Black men and 
for the social and emotional destruction of Black children.131 As a result, 
African-American women still cannot meet society's requirements for the 
"good mother." 
In addition, under the confines of the cult of domesticity, Black wo-
men could never attain the ideal image of motherhood, no matter how 
much they conformed to· its middle-class conventions, because, under this 
ideology, motherhood is defined as White. The maternal standards created 
to confine women are not merely sex-based norms that Black women just 
happen to fail. As Professor Barbara Omolade argues, it becomes apparent 
that one must be White to be a "woman" in this grand institution of moth-
erhood: "Under racism and bondage, Black women lose recognition and 
status as 'women.' The only 'women' are those whose men have ultimate 
control and domination over people of color. Thus, it becomes understood 
128. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, & CLASS 182 (1981). 
129. See JUDITH RoLLINs, BETWEEN WoMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS 37 
(1985). 
130. Ferguson, supra note 75, at 171. 
131. See, e.g., ABRAM KARDINER & LIONEL 0VESEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION 59-60 
(1951); OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & REsEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABO!l., THE NEGRO 
FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29-34 (1965) (linking Black family problems 
with the matriarchal structure). 
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and axiomatic-to be white and female is to be 'woman ... .' " 132 Addi-
tionally, Professor Ann Ferguson notes: 
Motherhood for [Black women] was not, like that for "full" 
(white) humans, a chosen career, but a natural, involuntary pro-
cess as it is for all beasts of burden. The image is created of 
black people mating like dogs. Under this stereotype, black wo-
men could not be expected to be moral authorities like white 
mothers. 133 
Hence, African-American women, under this regime, could never be 
viewed as appropriate mothers. They were regarded as lacking both sexual 
purity and whiteness, essential components of proper women and mothers. 
2. Motherhood, Race, and Work 
The broad-based employment discrimination, and subsequent abject 
poverty, faced by African-American people is a second facet of the racist 
domination that is supported by the cult of domesticity and faced by Black 
women. Married African-American women of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries did not benefit from the advent of the family 
wage because Black male workers were not afforded a family wage. The 
family wage was given only to male workers in unionized occupations, into 
which African-American workers were denied entry.134 Cognizant of this 
dichotomy between the "proper" place for women, which was outside of 
the paid labor market, and the reality of employment discrimination faced 
by Black men, Black middle-class leaders of the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century did not view African-American working mothers as inher-
ently deviant. Instead, these Black activists supported both the precepts of 
the cult of domesticity and the Black labor agendas, particularly those that 
sought family wages for Black men. 135 Therefore, Black women were left 
with the double goal of satisfying White society's view of womanhood and 
meeting the material needs of Black communities. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the widespread employment discrimina-
tion faced by the African-American community, Black women have always 
participated in the production of wealth, even during and directly following 
pregnancy. During the period of legalized slavery, Black women slaves 
were used as breeders136 and were often required to work in the fields until 
132. Omolade, supra note 60, at 175; see also Roberts, supra note 30, at 15-16. 
133. Ferguson, supra note 75, at 170-71. 
134. PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON 
RACE AND SEX JN AMERICA 63 (1984). 
135. See Boris, supra note 62, at 40. 
136. See DAv1s, supra note 128, at 7; JoNES, supra note 58, at 12. 
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they went into labor. 137 As historian Jacqueline Jones notes, many slave 
owners "forced women to work in the fields during and after their 'confine-
ment' -a period of time that might last as long as four or six weeks, or 
might be considerably shortened by masters who had women deliver their 
children between the cotton rows."138 Because the culture defined real wo-
men as weak and timid, the difficult physical labor that slave women were 
required to perform also demonstrated to a "cult" -driven society that Black 
women were not "real" women. 139 
Until recently, African-American women worked in the paid labor 
market at much higher rates than White women. 14° For example, by 1880, 
fifty percent of Black women were in the paid labor force, compared with 
fifteen percent of White women. 141 In addition to performing domestic 
labor in their own homes, the vast majority of Black women labored for 
very little compensation in order to ensure their families' economic 
survival. 142 
Black women have always worked disproportionately as domestic la-
borers and in other occupations requiring affective labor. 143 For example, 
in 1890, 52% of African-American women in the paid labor force worked 
as domestic servants,144 and by 1930, 27.2% of African-American women 
in the paid labor force worked as domestic servants or laundresses, com-
pared to only 2.5% of White women.145 White women were more likely to 
be found in clerical, manufacturing, and professional positions, 146 such as 
retail sales, nursing, social work, and teaching. Although fewer women 
currently are employed in household labor, Black women continue to be 
found disproportionately in household labor and service occupations, in-
cluding traditional household/affective labor, such as cleaning-service 
workers, food-service workers, personal-service workers, and childcare 
137. JoNES, supra note 58, at 19. 
138. Id. 
139. Angela Davis argues: "In order to function as slave, the black woman had to be 
annulled as woman, that is, a woman in her historical stance of wardship under the entire 
male hierarchy." Davis, supra note 59, at 116. 
140. JoNES, supra note 58, at 8. 
141. Roberts, supra note 30, at 19. 
142. See Omolade, supra note 60, at 182-83. 
143. Affective labor is work that meets human needs for nurturing. This includes the 
work of sex, housecleaning, food preparation, childbearing, childcare, and eldercare. For 
further analysis, see ANN FERGUSON, BLOOD AT THE RooT: MOTHERHOOD, SEXUALITY AND 
MALE DOMINANCE 77-99 (1989). 
144. AMorr & MATTHAEI, supra note 5, at 160. 
145. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Racial Ethnic Women's Labor: The Intersection of Race, 
Gender, and Class Oppression, in HIDDEN ASPECTS OF WoMEN's WoRK 46, 56 (Christine 
Bose et al. eds., 1987). 
146. Id. 
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workers. 147 In 1970, 17 .8% of Black women in the paid labor force 
worked as domestic servants while 25.5% worked in these types of service 
industries. 148 By contrast, in 1990, 1.1 % of all Americans in the paid labor 
force worked in private households as domestic workers and 22.3% 
worked in service industries; 149 less than one percent of White people 
working did so as private household workers and only 11.8% worked in 
service occupations. 150 Hence, the nature of the work that Black women 
were expected to perform did not change after slavery. African-American 
women have continued to perform affective labor under the constant super-
vision of White people, including the rearing of White children as mam-
mies, nannies, and daycare providers. 151 
Ironically, at the same time that African-American women have been 
called into service for the mothering of White children, these women have 
been labeled deviant in the raising of their own children. 152 It is well 
documented that this domestic labor in the service of White families under-
mined Black women in their positions as mothers. 153 As Professor Doro-
thy Roberts notes, "Black domestics . . . were unable to attend to their 
children during the day. They returned home late in the evening (if not on 
weekends) and had to entrust their children to the care of a neighbor, rela-
tive or older sibling, or leave them to wander in the neighborhood."154 
Black women continued to work as washerwomen, domestics, and 
seamstresses throughout the reign of the cult of domesticity155 and never 
gained any socially recognized power as mothers as a result of the cult's 
dogma. 156 Even those Black women of the middle class, who were not part 
147. AMorr & MAITHAEI, supra note 5, at 401. 
148. Glenn, supra note 145, at 63. I utilize the definition of service provided by Amott 
and Matthaei in drawing this inference. 
149. 1990 CENSUS, supra note 54, at 82 tbl. 82. 
150. Id. at 81 tbl. 81. 
151. See NAT'L COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, PAY EQUITY: AN IssUE OF RAcE, ETHNICITY 
AND SEX 21-22 (1987) (presenting statistical evidence that Black women are concentrated in 
service occupations, an example of which is the childcare provider); see also JoNES, supra 
note 58, at 164-68. In addition, in these traditional domestic service jobs, isolated in the 
homes of White people, African-American women are uniquely vulnerable to sexual vio-
lence by White men. See id. at 150. 
152. See JONES, supra note 58, at 184-85. 
153. Id. 
154. Roberts, supra note 30, at 19; see also JoNES, supra note 58, at 129 (detailing varia-
tions of servants' daily routines with their own children); "/live a Treadmill Life," in 
BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 227, 227, 228 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1973) ("I am allowed 
to go home to my children ... only once in two weeks, every other Sunday afternoon-even 
then I'm not permitted to stay all night."). 
155. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 76, at 121 (discussing work situations of poor Black 
women). 
156. See supra Section ill.C.1 and accompanying notes. 
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of the paid labor force, nevertheless were subjected to prevailing notions 
concerning their sexuality, morality, and maternal fitness. 
To the extent that all working mothers continue to be chastised and 
deemed deviant as mothers because they work and because that work gar-
ners them no respect, African-American mothers continue to suffer social 
censure. Notably, Black mothers are also deemed deviant when they do 
not participate in the waged labor market. This is particularly the case with 
single Black mothers. 157 Their motherhood, which is outside of the institu-
tion of marriage, is taken as evidence of immorality and irresponsibility: 
these women are immoral for having sexual intercourse outside of mar-
riage, and they are irresponsible for having children that they may not be 
able to financially support. 158 Poor, single Black mothers suffer direct at-
tacks on their mothering patterns through coerced contraception, 159 the re-
moval of their children from their homes, 160 and the conditioning of 
subsistence cash and in-kind welfare benefits on participation in "welfare 
to work" programs. 161 Yet these attacks on non-wage-earning mothers 
stand in stark contrast to the long-held cultural belief in the importance of 
children, especially infants, receiving care from their primary parent. 162 
Regardless of any stereotypes that confine White women as a result of 
their status of mother or potential mother, White society has always ex-
pected Black women to perform paid work, which in turn denigrates them 
in their roles as mothers. 163 Under the current ethos of welfare reform, 
157. Roberts, supra note 30, at 25. 
158. McClain, supra note 99, at 346. 
159. In the recent past, Black mothers were also subjected to forced sterilization. DAVIS, 
supra note 128, at 208-21. Other women of color also have been subjected to this reproduc-
tive abuse. See Carlos Velez-I, Se me Acabo la Cancion: An Ethnography of Non-con-
senting Sterilizations among Mexican Women in Los Angeles, in MEXICAN WoMEN IN TIIB 
UNITED STATES 76-78 (Magdalena Mora & Adelaide R. Del Castillo eds., 1980) (detailing 
non-consensual sterilizations of Mexican-American women in Los Angeles between 1971 
and 1974). 
160. Gray & Nybell, supra note 60, at 513 (noting that approximately one half of chil-
dren in foster care are Black). 
161. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No 104-193, § 103(a)(l), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-13 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 601 et 
seq.) (stating that the purpose of statute is to end dependence of needy parents by promoting 
work). 
162. Cf LEACH, supra note 102, at 83-84 (describing the importance for infants of care 
by parents or by others with parent-like commitments and stating that outside caregivers 
have little incentive to provide for infants' emotional needs). 
163. Sojourner Truth recognized the impossible paradox of Black womanhood in 
America when she said to a group of White feminists: 
Look at my arm! ... I have plowed, and planted, and gathered into barns and no 
man could head me-and ar'n't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as 
much as a man (when I could get it), and bear de lash as well-and ar'n't I a 
2001] Nurturing in the Service of White Culture 115 
poor Black mothers of very young children are expected to work in the 
paid labor market, while middle-class women, "real women," are en-
couraged to stay at home with their children. 164 Poor women of color are 
denigrated as bad mothers, while middle-class mothers are praised for jug-
gling well their varied responsibilities. 
Attacks on Black mothers result, in part, from society's belief that 
Black motherhood is at best flawed and that poor Black mothers are a 
danger to their children.165 Accordingly, Black motherhood is viewed as 
abnormal, and Black children are not benefited by it. 166 Indeed, African-
American mothers have been found guilty of disciplining their children too 
harshly, 167 emasculating their sons, 168 defeminizing their daughters, 169 and 
woman? I have borne thirteen chilem and seen 'em mos' all sold off into slavery, 
and when I cried out with a mother's grief, none but Jesus heard-and ar'n't I a 
woman? 
OLIVE GILBERT, NARRATIVE OF SOJOURNER TRUTH: A BoNDSWOMAN OF OLDEN TIME, WITH 
A HISTORY OF HER LABORS AND CORRESPONDENCE DRAWN FROM HER "BooK OF LIFE" 134 
(Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., Oxford University Press 1991) (1878) (quoting a speech given 
in 1851 at a women's rights convention in Akron, Ohio). 
These practices of forced labor by African-American mothers continued well into the 
contemporary period. For example, under the New Deal, the income support program for 
poor, unmarried women with children, Aid to Dependent Children, allowed states to employ 
eligibility practices that excluded poor Black single mothers. JoNES, supra note 58, at 263; 
see ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 76, at 318. 
164. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in various sections 
of 7, 8, 21, 25 and 42 U.S.C.). 
165. Marian Wright Edelman, founder and president of the Children's Defense Fund, has 
asserted that welfare reform is being used as a proxy for race discrimination: "While it is no 
longer acceptable in most polite circles to race-bait explicitly, bashing welfare has become 
the next best resort for politicians." Robin Toner, New Politics of Welfare Focuses on Its 
Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 1992 at Al, A16; see also OFFICE OF PoLicY PLANNING & 
RESEARCH, supra note 131, at 29-34 (warning that most Black youth are in danger of be-
coming trapped by the matriarchal pathology); Charles Murray, And Now for the Bad News, 
37 SOCIETY 13 (Nov. 1999) (blaming unmarried Black mothers for the character of poor 
Black neighborhoods and negative socialization of Black children). 
166. In fact, Black children are not deemed worthy of mothering. See Roberts, supra 
note 62, at 873-74 (noting that welfare reform devalues Black women's work in their 
homes, because society views African-American children as inherently useless); SOLINGER, 
supra note 63, at 29 (arguing that Black unmarried mothers are said to offer bad value 
(Black babies) at a high price (taxpayer-supported welfare grants)). 
167. See Gray & Nybell, supra note 60, at 518-19; ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NoBODY's 
CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 63, 235 
( 1999) (reporting that Black children are abused and neglected at a disproportionate rate and 
suggesting that Black parents are victims of racism whereby the state is more likely to 
remove children and terminate parental rights after abuse has been identified). 
168. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, supra note 131, at 29-34. 
169. Id. 
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retarding their children's educational attainments.17° All in all, "contem-
porary poverty rhetoric blames Black single mothers for perpetuating pov-
erty by transmitting a deviant lifestyle to their children."171 
The African-American community's seeming acceptance of single 
motherhood and single mothers is also perceived as deviant. 172 It is true 
that the treatment of single pregnant women has differed in the Black and 
White communities. Historically, White single mothers have been shunned 
by their families. 173 Before legalized abortion, single White pregnant wo-
men were either married off or sent to maternity homes until delivery and 
until the baby was adopted by an outside family. 174 The White unmarried 
mother, by relinquishing her child for adoption, was seen as repentant, and 
her family's response to her pregnancy was seen as normal. As historian 
Rickie Solinger notes, "White illegitimacy was generally not perceived as a 
'cultural' or racial defect, or as a public expense, so the stigma suffered by 
the white unwed mother was individual and familial." 175 
The response of White families to the pregnancies of their single 
daughters is antithetical to the values of African-American families. In the 
Black community, single motherhood traditionally has been accepted as an 
unfortunate part of life. Single pregnant women are not married off, sent 
away to have their babies, or forced to place their babies for adoption. 
Black families often believe that it is better for their children not to make 
marriages based solely on pregnancy, 176 and they find adoption unaccept-
able. 177 Single mothers are integrated into the community with the support 
170. This is especially true when African-Americans are compared to model minorities 
such as Asian-Americans. Cf. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL 
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLAss STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (claiming that 
Blacks are, on average, less intelligent than Whites and that the low intelligence of the 
group explains its social problems, including low educational achievement). 
171. Roberts, supra note 62, at 874; see also Martha A. Fineman, Images of Mothers in 
Poverty Discourses, 1991 DuKE L.J. 274, 285-93 (1991) (contending that poverty dis-
courses label single motherhood as deviant and responsible for the perpetuation of poverty). 
172. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, supra note 131, at 5-12. 
173. SoLINGER, supra note 63, at 5-6 (detailing the circumstances that faced White single 
mothers in the 1950s and 1960s and contrasting those conditions with those faced by single 
Black mothers of the time). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 25. 
176. Id. at 78. 
177. Id. at 6 ("As one Chicago mother of a single black pregnant teenager said ... , 'It 
would be immoral to place the baby [for adoption]. That would be throwing away your 
own flesh and blood."'); see also Joyce E. Everett, Introduction: Children in Crisis, in 
CHILD WELFARE: AN AFRocENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 1, 3-4 (Joyce E. Everett et al. eds., 1991) 
(noting that Black children as compared with White children remain in foster care for longer 
periods of time, experience multiple placements, and are less likely to be adopted); Zanita 
E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Children, 10 HARV. BLAcKLETIER 
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of their families and others in the community. The support of Black single 
mothers by Black families has been used as evidence that the Black com-
munity and Black mothers are pathological and sexually deviant.178 
IV. Race and Gestational Surrogacy: Why Can't a Black Woman 
Mother a White Child? 
Even though African-American women are viewed as deviant mothers 
by the dominant culture, they nevertheless are called upon to perform af-
fective labor179 for White families. Black women traditionally have per-
formed the affective labor of caring for White families' homes and children 
in disproportionate numbers. 180 As Professor Barbara Katz Rothman 
maintains: 
People in our society have been substituting for aspects of moth-
ering for a long time, always along the same patterns. Upper-
class women have bought the services of lower-class women to 
provide one or another mothering service for their children. Or, 
it might more accurately be said in some circumstances, upper-
class men have bought the services of lower-class women to sup-
plement the services of their wives. Some societies have let men 
have mistresses while their wives mothered; some have let men 
hire servants to do the mothering so that their wives could be 
reserved for their sexual and social uses. 181 
While African-American women are devalued in their roles of providing 
affective labor to their own children, they have been, and continue to be, 
valued for the affective labor they perform for White people-so long as 
such service is performed under the moral supervision of White adults who 
can act as rational, moralizing, and controlling influences over the "natu-
ral" excesses of Black female sexuality and irresponsibility.182 
Gestational surrogacy is another instance where Black women are val-
ued for their affective labor in the service of White people. This is espe-
cially evident when the gestational surrogate's relationship to the child she 
J. 39, 41 (1993) (asserting that the adoption system in America was not originally designed 
to meet the needs of Black couples or to benefit Black children). 
178. See, e.g., SOLINGER, supra note 63, at 195-96 (using the example of Annie Lee 
Davis, who worked to gain access to social services for Black unmarried mothers equal to 
that of their White counterparts by first trying to show that Black unwed mothers were 
psychological and moral equivalents of Whites). 
179. FERGUSON, supra note 143, at 83 (discussing affective labor as labor that meets 
human needs for sexuality, nurturance, and children). 
180. See supra pp. 112-13. 
181. Barbara Katz Rothman, Women as Fathers: Motherhood and Child Care Under a 
Modified Patriarchy, 3 GENDER & Soc'y 89, 95 (1989). 
182. See supra notes 123-25 regarding Black women's perceived sexual aberrance. 
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bears goes unrecognized or devalued by the law. Johnson v. Calvert183 
demonstrates that maternity determinations, whether by genetic relation-
ships or contract law, rely on criteria that preferentially devalue Black 
motherhood and value the affective labor of Black women only when per-
formed for the benefit of White families. 
A. Motherhood and Fatherhood: Legal and Cultural Definitions 
Before the invention of newer reproductive technologies, such as in 
vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, and surrogate/contract pregnancy, "nat-
ural" maternity was governed by the Latin maxim mater est quam demon-
strat or "by gestation, the mother is demonstrated."184 Motherhood 
necessarily was based on the woman's obvious biological ties to the baby 
to whom she had given birth, but motherhood was also based on social ties 
of nurture and care existing between women and children. In fact, custody 
preference for mothers, such as the "tender-years" presumption of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was based on stereotypical, but 
socially required, notions of women's "natural" functions of nurturing chil-
dren. 185 Even though maternity has been defined by the biological terms of 
pregnancy, women's social relationships to their children also have been 
recognized by reference to the social ties of nurture. 
Conversely, fatherhood traditionally has been defined not by nurturing 
relationships between children and men but rather by men's actual or pre-
sumed genetic contribution to children and their social relationships with 
the children's mothers. 186 At common law, a married man had complete 
183. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
184. Id. at 781. 
185. See, e.g., Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. 
REv. 335, 342-45 (1982). 
186. At common law, legal fatherhood could only exist inside of legal marriage. Men 
who "fathered" children outside of marriage were not legal fathers, and as a result those 
children born outside of marriage had no legal father. For a fuller analysis, see Mary L. 
Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the 
Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 60, 67-69 (1995). 
Since the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court has significantly changed the legal 
relationship between fathers and children born outside of marriage. In a series of cases, the 
Court recognized legal paternity only where the biological father had maintained a social 
relationship with the mother that was akin to a traditional nuclear family. See, e.g., Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648-49 (1972) (awarding custody to the biological unwed father 
after the mother's death because the father and mother had lived together for eighteen years 
and the biological father had acted as a parent); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 
(1979) (denying the right of the unwed father to block the adoption of his biological child 
by the child's step-father when the unwed father had not participated in the rearing of the 
child). Compare Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254 (1978) (holding that the rights of 
the unwed father were not violated by the court's refusal to allow him to block adoption by 
the step-father of an eleven year-old child, where the unwed father had not previously par-
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control over children born of his wife during marriage, because the chil-
dren were presumably made from his "seed,"187 a presumption furthered 
by the tight controls on women's sexuality.188 Throughout much of the 
eighteenth century, a father's control over children was so complete as to 
permit the conveyance of parental rights to a third party without the 
mother's consent. 189 Although feminist activism during the nineteenth 
century brought about statutes that granted mothers equal rights to their 
children and replaced the common law preference for paternal control, 190 
fatherhood nevertheless continues to be defined largely in biological terms, 
and where possible, in such a way as to protect the patriarchal family. 191 
Even with the availability of DNA testing, the legal presumptions regard-
ing biological paternity have changed little. The law continues to protect 
fatherhood in such a way as to protect the traditional, patriarchal family. 192 
ticipated in the child's life); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (noting that the 
mere existence of a biological link to a child is insufficient to give the unwed father protec-
tion under due process if he has not demonstrated a parental relationship); and Michael H. 
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (denying legal paternity where father's relationship 
with mother did not resemble marriage). Janet Dolgin and others have noted that the recog-
nition of parental rights of unwed fathers has depended more on the fathers' social relation-
ship with the mothers than their genetic ties with their children. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a 
Gene: Judicial Assumptions about Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REv. 637, 649 (1993); Rob-
erts, supra note 22, at 253; FINEMAN, supra note 96, at 84-87. 
187. Under the common law, the legal presumption of paternity could be rebutted only 
by evidence that the husband was physically incapable of procreation due to impotence or 
lack of physical access to his wife. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *457; Mis-
covich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (reviewing the common 
law); see also D. KELLY WEISBERG & SusAN FRELICH APPELTON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 
512 (1998). 
188. Cf. Shanley, supra note 186, at 68-69 ("[F]or without marriage, who would know 
for certain who the father of a child might be?"). 
189. Id. at 68; see Michael Grossberg, Who Gets the Child? Custody, Guardianship, and 
the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, 9 FEMINlST STUD. 235, 
238-39 (1983). 
190. Shanley, supra note 186, at 69. 
191. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491U.S.110 (1989) (holding that the state has a 
valid interest in preserving "unitary family" and that neither Michael H. nor his genetic 
daughter had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in maintaining a relationship when 
the mother's husband asserted a paternity right). 
192. As Janet Dolgin argues: 
In cases in which evidence of a man's biological paternity does not harmonize 
with the law's preference as to legal paternity, evidence of biological paternity 
has been suppressed, rather than openly acknowledged and then discounted. 
Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideol-
ogy of Family, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 523, 529 (2000) (citing Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 
726, 729-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (refusing to consider DNA evidence that would refute 
legal paternity of child born during the marriage)). 
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B. Johnson v. Calvert: The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals 
In Johnson v. Calvert, Anna Johnson, an African-American woman, 
made an extraordinary biological claim. She claimed that she was the bio-
logical mother of a child to whom she had given birth but whose genetic 
make-up was that of a White child. Relying on the Uniform Parentage Act 
(UP A), 193 which provides in part that "natural" maternity "may be estab-
lished by proof of her having given birth to the child," Johnson claimed she 
was the child's legal mother because she was the birth mother.194 In evalu-
ating her claim and the claim of the child's genetic parents, the trial court 
and the California Court of Appeals both denied Johnson's biological 
claims and held that the Calverts were both the natural and legal parents of 
the child. Anna Johnson was denied any and all rights to the child she had 
carried for nine months and to whom she had given birth. She was deemed 
a legal stranger to the child. 
In his opinion, the trial court judge, Judge Parslow, stated that "a three 
parent family is contrary to public policy, [and] the weight of the evidence, 
and logic [is that such a family] is not in the child's best interests."195 He 
also found that there was substantial evidence to indicate that Johnson, the 
birth mother, had never bonded with the child. 196 He described Johnson as 
"a host in a sense" to the child.197 Parslow characterized Johnson's rela-
tionship as a business transaction198 and as a foster care relationship. 199 He 
also described the relationship as a "wet-nursing" relationship.200 These 
descriptions of Johnson's relationship to the child to whom she had given 
birth are instructive. They support a legal and social order that allows and 
encourages gestational surrogates to sell their affective labor. These de-
scriptions reject a regime that recognizes any appreciable legal recognition 
of a relationship growing out of that labor. 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that 
Crispina Calvert was the child's natural and legal mother but relied on a 
different analysis. The appellate court's analysis attached to Crispina Cal-
vert the stereotypical attributes of motherhood while describing Johnson's 
193. CAL. C1v. CODE§§ 7000-7021 (West 1975) (repealed 1992). 
194. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (Ct. App. 1991). 
195. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-63-31-90, slip op. at 2, 4 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 
filed Nov. 21, 1990). 
196. Id. 
197. Calif. Judge Speaks on Issue of Surrogacy, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 36. 
198. Id.; see also Dolgin, supra note 186, at 686. 
199. No. X-63-31-90, slip op. at 3; Allen, supra note 24, at 24 (quoting the trial 
transcript). 
200. Allen, supra note 24, at 24. 
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relationship with the child in commercial terms.2°1 Relying on a strained 
reading of the UP A, the Court of Appeals found that the statute required 
that maternity attach to the genetic mother of the child. The UP A, how-
ever, was enacted into California law decades before gestational surrogacy 
was possible. Thus, at the time of the UP A's passage in California, legisla-
tors rightly assumed that the woman who gave birth to a child was the 
child's only natural mother, because the genetic and gestational functions 
could not at that time be separated. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that 
although birth or blood tests could establish natural motherhood, the statute 
preferred blood evidence. By reading, in gender-neutral terms, a provision 
of the UPA intended to determine paternity when denied by a husband,202 
the appellate court held that the preferred method of determining both 
motherhood and fatherhood, according to statute, was by the use of blood 
evidenoe.203 The court stated, "We must 'resolve' the question of Anna's 
claim to maternity as we would resolve the question of a man's claim to (or 
liability for) paternity when blood tests positively exclude him as a 
candidate. "204 
Although the Court of Appeals described Johnson's contribution to 
the child as "profound," the court nevertheless held that the contribution 
did not entitle Johnson to a constitutionally protected relationship with the 
child, in part because she was outside the "protected family unit."205 The 
appellate court in Johnson valued the genetic contribution of the Calverts 
over the gestational, nurturing contribution of Johnson and, as others have 
noted, in so doing "dismantl[ed] female claims based on nurturance" in 
favor of "a patriarchal model of genetic entitlement."206 Indeed, the court 
stated, "As evidence at trial showed, the whole process of human develop-
ment is 'set in motion by the genes.' There is not a single organic system 
of the human body not influenced by an individual's underlying genetic 
makeup."207 The court did not value all of the contributions equally but 
rather selected to bifurcate them absolutely. The court venerated the ge-
netic contribution of the egg and sperm while ignoring the contribution of 
gestation, a uniquely female contribution. As Barbara Katz Rothman 
notes, "When we accept the patriarchal valuing of the seed, there is no 
201. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372-74 (Ct. App. 1991). 
202. Id. at 375. 
203. Id. at 376. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 378-80. 
206. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on 
Parents' Rights, 14 CARD<YZO L. REv. 1747, 1778 (1993); see also Randy Frances Kandel, 
Which Came First: The Mother or the Egg? A Kinship Solution to Gestational Surrogacy, 
47 RUTGERS L. REv. 165, 176 (1994). 
207. 286 Cal. Rptr. at 380. 
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doubt-the real mother, like the real father, is the genetic parent."208 As a 
result of elevating the contribution of the White parents to the exclusion of 
any contribution made by Anna Johnson, the court in Johnson completely 
devalued the contribution of the African-American woman in this case and 
devalued the gestational surrogacy experience, which is perhaps uniquely 
African-American. 209 
By framing the conflict solely in terms of genetics, both courts made 
invisible the depth of Johnson's claim. Johnson's claim was not solely 
based on her biological contribution to the child. Johnson's claim was also 
based on the nurturing relationship that she had already established with 
the child through the nine months of gestation. As ethicist Ruth Macklin 
notes, scientific evidence exists that emotional attachments develop be-
tween a woman and the fetus she carries, regardless of whether the woman 
and fetus are genetically related: "Mothers develop good feelings toward 
their unborn children because of fetal movements, which have 'a major 
effect on mother's thoughts or feelings about the baby. The mother often 
begins to feel the baby is hers.' "210 Macklin also notes that evidence sug-
gests that a newborn has the ability to recognize its birth mother's voice.211 
Judge Parslow found these emotional ties unimportant and unpersuasive: 
There is some disagreement on ... uterine bonding from child to 
mother amongst the authorities .... I found most persuasive that 
there really isn't clear evidence of emotional bonding between 
child and mother in the uterine environment. There is certainly 
attachment . . . and there may be and usually is and often is a 
bonding between a person carrying the child and the child .... 212 
The Court of Appeals seemed to consider Johnson's emotional contribution 
to the child more seriously but nevertheless concluded that her emotional 
contribution did not entitle her to a legal relationship to the child. 213 
208. Rothman, supra note 181, at 96. 
209. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
210. Rum MAcKLrN, SURROGATES & OTHER MoTHERS 224 (1994). 
211. Id. 
212. Calif. Judge Speaks on Issue of Surrogacy, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 36. 
213. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 378, 379-80. In arguing why a birth mother's 
wishes regarding custody of a newborn should be weighed more heavily than the wishes of 
a biological father, Professor Mary Shanley urges: 
At the time of birth the relationship of biological father and mother to the child is 
neither biologically nor socially symmetrical. The biological mother has carried 
the child for nine months, an activity for which there is no precise male analog; 
indeed no one else can perform functions analogous to those of gestation. Her 
"expectant" state has affected both the biological mother's own physiological ex-
perience and the ways in which others view and interact with her. . .. To what 
extent should asymmetry of biological function during gestation affect the right to 
· make custodial decisions concerning a _newborn? 
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In some ways, the Court of Appeals' reaction makes perfect sense. 
How can we reliably trust affection when we know that affection without 
more is highly unreliable? This is thought to be especially true of women's 
affection.214 Anyone who has been involved in a romantic relationship 
knows that affection is a fickle thing, subject to change. Affection, then, is 
perceived as shifting sand, an unsafe place to lay responsibility for the care 
of children. Genes are different. Genetics feels more like ownership than 
does affection, and in some ways, genetics functions as a proxy for owner-
ship. If we own our genes, then maybe we also own the children who are 
the products of our genetic reproduction. And we are expected to take 
responsibility for the things that we own. Thus, in contrast to affection, 
genetics is a more stable place to situate legal parenthood. 
Moreover, the science of genetics functions much like the science of 
rationality in traditional liberal thought. In classic liberal thought, rational-
ity is seen as a natural gift from which rights should flow.215 Traditionally, 
race and gender have been used as proxies for rationality. That is, White 
men have it, and other folks don't. In discussing rationality as the basis for 
rights in antebellum America and the exclusion of Blacks from rights, Pro-
fessor Cheryl Harris maintains: 
The inherent contradiction between the bondage of Blacks and 
republican rhetoric that championed the freedom of all men was 
resolved by positing that Blacks were different. The laws did not 
mandate that Blacks be accorded equality under the law because 
Shanley, supra note 186, at 82-83; see also BARBARA KATZ RoTIIMAN, RECREATING MoTH-
ERHooD: IDEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 35-36 (1989) (claiming 
that, under current procreative thinking, at birth, babies belong to their mothers because of 
the unique nurturant relationship that had existed until that point, thus making pregnancy a 
social as well as a physical relationship); Nancy S. Erickson, The Feminist Dilemma Over 
Unwed Parents' Custody Rights: The Mother's Rights Must Take Priority, 2 LAW & lNEQ. 
447, 461-62 (1984) (basing the rights of the birth mother on the fact that she is not only the 
primary caretaking parent but also the only caretaking parent); Kim M. Blankenship et al., 
Reproductive Technologies and the U.S. Courts, 7 GENDER & Soc'Y 8, 29 (Mar. 1993) 
(arguing for greater rights for birth mothers and for recognition of their contributions, be-
cause gestation involves a social relationship as well as a biological one); PHYLLIS 
CHESLER, SCARED BoND: THE LEGACY oF BABY M 23 (1988) (acknowledging the bond 
between mothers and their children developed in utero ). 
214. See. e.g .• CHRISTINE DE PIZAN, THE BooK OF THE CITY OF LADIES 164-66 (Earl 
Jeffrey Richards trans., Persea Books, Inc. 1982) (refuting the fragility and inconstancy of 
women). 
215. I have asserted elsewhere that social contract theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued 
that women are naturally subjugated because they lack both autonomy and rationality. 
April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race and the Male Sex-Right, 75 
OR. L. REv. 1037, 1065 (1996) (citing JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, EMILE; OR, ON EDUCA-
TION 358 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1979) (1778)). 
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nature-not man, not power, not violence-had determined their 
degraded status.216 
Here, it is nature, verified by science-not man, not power, and certainly not 
violence-that determines a woman's parental rights to the child born as a 
result of gestational surrogacy. Nature, not the violence of law, discon-
nects the gestational surrogate from the child she bears. Similarly, declara-
tions of the importance of contract law in this area operate in an analogous 
fashion by injecting old-fashioned gendered claims of rationality into for-
mulations of justice. 
C. Gestational Parentage: Contract Claims and the California 
Supreme Court 
The California Supreme Court superseded the appellate court's deci-
sion and held that the Calverts were the child's natural and legal parents. It 
looked to the intent of the parties as evidenced by the contract rather than 
looking to biology or genetics.217 The court first noted that the factual 
basis of each woman's claim was "obvious."218 Anna Johnson was the 
undisputed birth mother, and Crispina Calvert was the undisputed genetic 
mother.219 The court also noted that the UPA offered no help in deciding 
the question of parentage between Ms. Johnson and Mrs. Calvert.220 Be-
cause there was no legislative preference between genetic and gestational 
evidence, the court stated that it could look only to the contract signed by 
the parties in order to determine the parties' intentions.221 Looking to the 
contract, the court held that Mrs. Calvert, the woman who intended to be 
the child's social mother at the time the contract was signed and the insem-
ination performed, was the true mother of the child. Justice Panelli 
reasoned, 
Because two women each have presented acceptable proof 
of maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without 
inquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in the surro-
gacy agreement. ... 
We conclude that although the Act recognizes both genetic 
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother 
and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in 
one woman, she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she 
216. Harris, supra note 14, at 1745. 
217. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). 
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who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended 
to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law.222 
Furthermore, relying on arguments made by Professor Marjorie Shultz, the 
state supreme court reasoned that by locating parentage in the intending 
parents and not in the gestating woman, the court was acting in the best 
interests of the child.223 The interests of children, particularly at the outset 
of their lives, are" '[un]likely to run contrary to those of adults who chose 
to bring them into being.' Thus, '[h]onoring the plans and expectations of 
adults who will be responsible for a child's welfare is likely to correlate 
significantly with positive outcomes for parents and children alike.' "224 In 
addition, the court reasoned that Johnson's original intent not to act as the 
child's social mother demonstrated her maternal unfitness or incompetence 
and was also determinative of the court's rejection of her claim to legal 
maternal status.225 The court concluded that "it may be argued that, by 
voluntarily contracting away any rights to the child, the gestator has, in 
effect, conceded the best interest of the child is not with her."226 Accord-
ingly, as has been noted, "the majority assumed a best-interest analysis as 
part of its reconstruction of parentage through reliance on the notion of 
intent."221 
In this instance, intent acts like rationality in classic liberal thought. 
Only those possessed of or capable of rationality are viewed as deserving 
of rights. In the gestational surrogacy context, the White couple is viewed 
as rational. The woman's "natural" irrationality is resolved by her submis-
sion to her husband. 228 The rationality is evidenced by the act of con-
tracting. Hence, contracting is evidence not only of good intentions but 
also of rational thought. In contrast, the gestational surrogate's desire to 
breach the contract is viewed as a confirmation of her lack of rationality. 
Her deficiency in this regard makes her an inappropriate repository of pa-
rental rights. Furthermore, her lack of rationality in this contractual trans-
222. Id. at 782. 
223. Id. at 782-83; see also Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technologies and 
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wisc. L. REv. 297, 
397 (1990); Schiff, supra note 10, at 277-90 (arguing that initial intention of the parties 
should determine the issue of legal maternity). 
224. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (citations omitted). 
225. See Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Contradiction and the New Reproductive 
Technologies, 28 Aruz. ST. L.J. 473, 537 (1996). 
226. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10. 
227. Dolgin, supra note 225, at 537. But note that the intent analysis has not been con-
vincing when asserted by lesbian mothers. For a full analysis, see Nicole Bemer, lntent-
Based Parenthood Held Inapplicable in Case of Lesbian Mothers, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S 
L.J. 213 (1994). 
228. Under common law, a married woman's identity was subsumed under that of her 
husband. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 187, at *442. 
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action, when added to the stereotypes surrounding the parental fitness of 
African-American women, makes clear the inappropriateness of legal 
motherhood for her in this context. The stakes are too high. The life and 
the moral well-being of a White child are at stake. 
Moreover, the intent analysis of the court also serves to strengthen the 
gendered hierarchy between rationality and affection. While affection may 
seem well and good, maternal affection is sometimes viewed as dangerous 
to children.229 Hence, female affection can be trusted only when paired 
with male rationality, and, in this case, rationality is equated with contract 
compliance. This dynamic serves to reinforce the subordination of affec-
tion to rationality. In effect, then, affection only engenders rights when 
coupled with rationality. 
V. Conclusion: Race and Gestational Parentage 
Race has long played a part in the determination of parentage. As 
others have noted, even seemingly race-neutral legal rules have been used 
to ensure racial purity and White supremacy.230 Historically, both race-
conscious and race-neutral laws also have been used to assure White con-
trol over Black children. For example, race-conscious slave laws mandated 
that the children born to Black slaves were not the property of their 
mothers (one definition of maternity) but rather the property of the White 
slave owners, thereby guaranteeing White control over Black children.231 
A more contemporaneous example of a race-neutral law working to 
assure White control over Black children is the federal adoption statute that 
forbids federally funded agencies from using race as a factor in foster and 
adoption placement and decision-making.232 The intent or function of this 
statute is not to encourage or allow African-Americans to adopt White chil-
dren. Instead, this statute is designed to allow White people to adopt Black 
229. Caplan & Hall-McCorquodale, supra note 102, at 547-59 (stating that in psycholog-
ical literature, mothers are blamed for the emotional problems of their children). 
230. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 22, at 211; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(holding that marriage and anti-miscegenation laws were being used to promote and rein-
force White supremacy); see also Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instru-
ment of Procreative Power, 3 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495 (1993) (asserting that the marital 
presumption and evidentiary rules regarding paternity of children of married women trans-
fer procreative power to White men while denying procreative power to Black women). 
231. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1024; Fellows, supra note 230, at 504; Roberts, supra 
note 22, at 225-27 (stating that under slavery, White wives "bore white children to continue 
the master's legacy" while Black women bore children "who were legally slaves and thus 
replenished the master's capital assets"). 
232. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 
§§ 551-554, 108 Stat 4056 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C § 671 (1996). 
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and other children of color. 233 In fact, it is generally viewed as not in the 
best interests of White children to be raised by Black people. In cases 
involving the custody of White children by the Black husbands of their 
White mothers, trial courts have somewhat consistently held that race can 
be used as a factor, although not the sole factor, in the denial of custody to 
the child's mother.234 
The holding of the California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert 
offers another example of a race-neutral rule that ensures that White chil-
dren will be controlled by White people. It also serves as yet another ex-
ample of the ways that Black women are allowed to serve White people: 
only in ways supporting White power. 
The Johnson decision typifies the position of African-American wo-
men vis-a-vis White children in the employment context. African-Ameri-
can women are expected to care for and love White children without any 
expectation of legal or social recognition of these relationships. In John-
son, the Black woman was allowed (and expected) to love and "mother" 
the White child as long as she claimed no real power over the child. In the 
gestational surrogacy context, the Black woman has the responsibility to 
care for the fetus as long as the Black woman is ultimately supervised by 
the White genetic parents. Social commentator Katha Pollit has also made 
this connection: 
It's not just that blacks are disproportionately poor and desperate, 
more likely to be single mothers and more likely to lack the re-
sources to sue. It's that their visible lack of genetic connection 
with the baby will argue powerfully against them in court. . . . 
[I]t is safe to say that few American judges are going to take 
seriously the claims of a black woman to a nonblack child. 
Black women have, after all, always raised white children with-
out acquiring any rights to them. 235 
233. See Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Dis-
course and Subordination, 21 REv. LAW & Soc. CHANGE 33, 41, 103-04 (1993-94) (con-
tending that advocates for transracial adoption are not in favor of a color-blind system but 
one where choosing across racial lines is reserved for Whites); Roberts, supra note 22, at 
265 (stating that the "thought of Black family adopting a White child, however, appears to 
be beyond our cultural imagination"). 
234. See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that race 
maybe considered in determining best interest of child in foster placement decisions in 
order to provide for child's racial and cultural needs); cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 
434 (1984) (holding that the effects of racial prejudice alone cannot justify removing an 
infant from the custody of its natural mother where a child had been removed because her 
White mother married a Black man); Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Ky. 1987) 
(referring to Palmore v. Sidoti). 
235. Pollit, supra note 24, at 842. 
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By asking who is the "real" or natural or legal mother in the gesta-
tional surrogacy cases, the courts mask the use of White power over the 
maternity of Black women, further devaluing the affectional ties Black wo-
men have not only with White children but with Black children as well. 
One example of the devaluation of Black women's affectional ties to Black 
children can be found in the welfare reform debate and the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA).236 The PRWORA is based in part on the notion that young 
single Black women are raising children alone.237 In fact, the 1990 census 
showed that 10,381,654 women (of all races) were the sole heads of fami-
lies. 238 What the rhetoric and the numbers fail to note is that many of these 
women are not raising their children alone. As Patricia Hill Collins has 
noted, African-American women continue to raise their children with the 
help of familial and community networks (othermothers).239 White 
power serves to erase these networks and retell Black single motherhood as 
a solitary venture that destroys Black youth.240 To the extent that these 
networks are acknowledged by the White power structure, they are deemed 
deviant.241 
Consequently, in the end, the only mothering patterns in which Black 
women participate are those endorsed and supported by the White estab-
lishment (or the State) and are the very ones in which Black women have 
no power or children and no validation as mothers. 
236. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
237. Cf. id. § 103(a)(l), 110 Stat. 2136 (mandating that teenage mothers live in super-
vised settings in order to receive public assistance). This suggests that Congress believed 
that poor young mothers were raising their children alone, without the assistance of their 
families. 
238. 1990 CENsus, supra note 54, at 41 tbl. 41. 
239. See supra pp. 96-97 and accompanying notes. 
240. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PoLICY PLANNING & REsEARCH, supra note 131, at 29-34; 
MURRAY, supra note 131. 
241. See Gray & Nybell, supra note 60, at 515-17 (detailing a project wherein child 
welfare workers were trained about the kinship networks of African-American families and 
noting that prior to the project many of the workers had been struggling to assert their own 
vision of the family system upon their clients). 
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